ARMY

AUGUST 1969 • 60¢



But Gap Is Closing

Finding and Assessing the Enemy—Combat's Lagging Fifth Element

By Lt. Gen. Harry W. O. Kinnard

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A new electronically-scanned airborne radar antenna, the U.S. Navy's first high-performance, X-band multimode, phased-array system, is now undergoing evaluation at Hughes. It has a 36-inch-diameter flat reflecting surface with 2400 radiating elements, and offers distinct advantages over mechanically-scanned gimballed antennas. It is designed for air-to-air search, multiple target tracking, terrain following and avoidance, and ground mapping.

A faster method for measuring the thermal insulating value of sandwich panels for portable shelters, developed recently at Hughes, cuts test time to only two to four hours instead of the three or four weeks previously required.

TV's "instant replay" technique is being used in a military design work study by Hughes engineers. They are using TV cameras to record the operation of command-and-control systems aboard U.S. Navy attack aircraft carriers. The video tape is edited to obtain the complete sequence of operations of various systems, then played back repeatedly for analysis. This enables the Hughes team to suggest improvements in both operating procedures and system design.

A multi-channel, crystal-controlled microwave source developed by Hughes makes it as simple to change channels on airborne data link, radar, and microwave communications systems as to change programs on a TV set. Twelve models are available in the frequency range of 800 to 9600 MHz, each with a choice of four (or even more) discrete frequencies. Modular, EMI-shielded construction permits .005% frequency stability and exceptionally low harmonics.

Safe landings in fog that normally would close an airport may be just around the corner. A Hughes-developed infrared imaging device called FLIR (Forward Looking Infra Red) turns the infrared scene ahead of the aircraft into a real-time display like a TV picture. Initial studies indicate that it may be possible to make safe landings when visibility is as short as 220 feet, depending on the nature of the fog, by using the FLIR in conjunction with existing ILS landing aids.

New radar equipment for Free World warships now being built by Hughes includes five complex antenna-radar-computer systems for guided-missile destroyers of Spain and five billboard-shaped radar antennas, four for France and one for Japan. The Hughes equipment will provide simultaneous three-dimensional information about air targets -- height, range, and bearing. Delivery of the units is expected to be completed by the summer of 1970.

A technique for cooling precision-regulated power supplies by immersing the circuits in a coolant has been developed by Hughes engineers. Total size is much reduced and there are no moving parts. The coolant isolates the circuits from airborne contaminants, damps vibration stresses, and has high dielectric strength. One power supply has operated without failure during a seven-year period of round-the-clock testing.

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Between the Lines

Seventy-two years ago, H. G. Wells committed to paper one of mankind's most enduring dreams, in an eerie little fantasy called *The Invisible Man.* Unlike some of Wells' other "scientific speculations," which we occasionally regard with a fascinated backward gaze, this one does not seem capable of being realized this side of the script of *Star Trek.*

But if the powers of physical invisibility remain locked in our imaginations, recent works of science have pushed us very close to the basic principle: to observe without being seen.

On "the other side of the hill," resourceful military commanders have been exploiting the natural means of battlefield invisibility since the beginning of organized warfare. The cover of darkness, of a friendly population, of rough terrain where the enemy finds it inconvenient to tread—all can give decisive advantage to the commander who knows how to manipulate them.

The Army's accelerated effort to strip away this cover and locate targets for its awesome firepower is the theme around which the editors have constructed the August issue.

We were reminded in our reflections that when Mr. Wells penned *The Invisible Man* (1897), armies were trading in the peacock plumage that gilded the Napoleonic age for the drabness of field gray and desert tan. The machine gun and the spade had erased even those last vestiges of gladiatorial and medieval "trial by combat," a notion that lingered long in the military traditions of the West.

Yet, the elemental principles of cover and concealment, of observation and battlefield reconnaissance that are second-nature in military training today, were still not implanted in the minds of commanders who relied mostly on raw courage and the prestige of their nation's arms.

In South Africa, at the turn of the century, the leading global power of the day badly stubbed its toe, attempting to subdue sharpshooting, field-wise opponents who refused to Stand Up and Fight Like Men. Four years and a near-total commitment were required before the British Army could wrest control of the countryside from the Boers. Even then, the harsh and brutal methods employed earned Great Britain such opprobrium that "Splendid Isolation" began to seem a reasonable policy.

When Lt. Gen. Harry W. O. Kinnard, the author of this month's opening article, took the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) to Vietnam in the summer of 1965, he faced enemies even more elusive than those who had bedeviled Sir Redvers Buller 70 years before. Gen. Kinnard had commanded the experimental 11th Air Assault Division, whose tests in the early 1960s foreshadowed an Army with unsurpassed mobility, communications, firepower and logistics.

But the ability to find the enemy, as Gen. Kinnard tells us, lagged behind our capacity to destroy him. Now the commanding general of Combat Developments Command, Gen. Kinnard writes of his command's rapid progress in closing the battlefield intelligence gap through the coordination of new systems of combat surveillance, target acquisition and night operations.

Appropriately, the target acquisition phase of the intelligence equation will be the subject of an AUSA symposium to be held at Fort Sill, Okla., 10-12 August.

Some of the intriguing detection devices so important to developing the fifth element of land combat are detailed in Robert G. McClintic's "Rolling Back the Night." The author is no stranger to the topic, or to these pages. A former associate editor of ARMY and of the *Journal of the Armed Forces,* Mr. McClintic is now an information specialist at the headquarters of Army Materiel Command. He shows us just how far battlefield illumination has come since flares and searchlights were about the only means of penetrating the cover of darkness. Radar, infrared, seismic and listening devices, and the light-intensifying starlight scopes are all thoroughly covered in his report on the hardware that is making 24-hour combat surveillance a reality.

A less sophisticated approach than that of our authors might conclude that the Army is trying to design an automated battlefield. But, as Gen. Kinnard notes, "equipment alone does not necessarily improve the Army's capability."

Any battlefield intelligence system must be supported by suitable doctrine and employ all sources of information, not the least of which is human observation and human powers of discrimination—intelligence devices are not intelligent.

ECL □

LT. GEN. CHARLES G. DODGE
USA, Ret.
Executive Vice President, AUSA

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ARMY

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☐ **Narrowing the Combat Intelligence Gap** *By Lt. Gen. Harry W. O. Kinnard* **22**

On the modern battlefield, detecting the enemy, by day and by night, is a tough job, but it may well be the key to survival. Devices used in surveillance and target acquisition must be matched with doctrine that prescribes their use, and by a capability for processing information that will rapidly convert raw data into usable intelligence.

☐ **Rolling Back the Night** *By Robert G. McClintic* **28**

The night no longer belongs to the enemy, for the U.S. Army has made great strides in penetrating darkness. Revolutionary new means of detection that intensify moonglow, star shine and even faint skyglow, have made it easier to spot enemy forces moving under the blanket of darkness.

☐ **What are Generals Made Of?—II** *By Maj. Gen. A. S. Newman* **38**

What characteristics lift the 'best qualified' above many other outstanding professional soldiers? Some qualities they were born with, but, in large measure, their success depends on what kind of personal and professional characters they develop for themselves.

☐ **In Tune With the Times** *By Col. S. Q. Lapias* **44**

By sticking grimly with a concept of military sociology that does not fit our times—one that persists in maintaining some obsolete trappings of the past—the Army is denying itself the services of many trained men whose skills it badly needs.

☐ **Hole-Hunting for Dragon's Teeth**

By Lt. Col. Richard W. Smith & Lt. Col. Norman L. Tiller **50**

The Viet Cong guerrilla is an expert at burrowing into the earth and camouflaging all entrances and exits. One battalion of the 35th Infantry soon learned how to find the enemy's hiding places and convert them into his grave.

☐ **The Indirect Approach** *By Lt. Col. Richard A. McMahon* **56**

Our strategy in Vietnam has been based essentially on the Clausewitzian principle that the only way to win a war is by destroying the enemy's forces through decisive battle. The indirect approach aims at defeating the insurgency rather than the guerrilla, through clear-and-hold operations that force the enemy to come to us.


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CONFIDENCE IN OER

■ I am sure that few missed Lt. Col. Claude H. Doughtie's "The Myths That Beset Those All-Important OERs," in the July issue. I have been retired for two years, but even with that gap, interest runs high in something which has played such an important part in your career.

In addition to the points made by Col. Doughtie, I recall that the system designers have been plagued by most raters rating too high, thereby reducing somewhat the ability of the system to differentiate. I recall, too, over the years, hearing of officers who felt that one undeserved poor report had destroyed their careers. Even with these possibilities, Col. Doughtie's myths, and the mistakes of the biased and uninformed, I still have complete confidence in the OER system. My service on a promotion board convinced me of its fairness and adequacy.

Since retiring, I have become more familiar with the means used in Civil Service and in industry to determine performance and standing. These systems cannot compare with our military systems. It must be conceded that part of the superiority of the military systems comes from the character of service. The itinerancy of officers in the services affords evaluation by many superiors in a variety of assignments, an advantage which is rare outside the military service. As time goes on, most of us serve under the lazy and the uninformed, the high and low raters, the hard and easy to please, as well as most of us outstanding report-writers. The result is a composite evaluation which cannot be approached in other career fields. As competition grows and few are chosen, so does the OER file to aid selection.

Those of you who are rated, take heart, and I hope you raters get more instruction as Col. Doughtie suggests.

LT. GEN. AUGUST SCHOMBURG
Arlington, Va.

EXPERTISE OR EDUCATION?

■ Gen. Hamilton H. Howze, in his article "In Defense of Academic 'Ignorance'," in the June issue, is the victim of an inability to distinguish differences between expertise in a skill and educational growth. A plumber may be highly skilled in unclogging drains, but he is not necessarily educated.

The ability to understand this difference is important. It accounts for the fact that for many years the U.S. Military Academy was not accredited as a higher institution of learning. It further accounts for the fact that superintendents of the academy, including Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor and Gen. William C. Westmoreland, have sought to educate prospective Army officers through changes in the curriculum—to include thorough studies in the humanities, the social and physical sciences—rather than through more vigorous programs of instruction in the combat skills, which are and should be taught and acquired in the Army's service schools.

Former U.S. Senator William Benton several years ago pointed out that he had been handicapped in both business and politics by the narrowness of his undergraduate studies in occupational skills—skills which have since become obsolete. He lamented that his college years had not been devoted to the pursuit of learning in the arts and sciences—those disciplines promoting the understanding of human behavior, history, and precision and style in the use of language.

Gen. Howze appears to have overlooked such pertinent realities that professional soldiers spend only a fractional part of their military careers in combat. Some never do. Moreover, only the extremely limited few, with skill training only, upon retirement are able to find a vice president's slot with industry serving the armed forces.

Although some 40 years separate the ages of Gen. Howze and Lt. Howard R. Ritter, it appears to me that Lt. Ritter in *Life* for 16 May, writes much more responsibly than does Gen. Howze, respecting the national security and the maturity of the professional soldier, when he—Lt. Ritter—states that "Esthetic-moral sensibilities and intellectual preferences notwithstanding, the military establishment is, for good or ill, destined to be with us for some time to come. Some day, please God, it will be different, but not tomorrow or next year. In the meantime it behooves us, citizens of a common world, to staff our military with the sanest, best-educated, most sensitive and thoughtful men available."

WILMOT B. JACOBS
Hampton, Va.

■ *Mr. Jacobs and I can spend considerable time telling each other that he misses the main point, which, to my mind, is that the line officer needs education in the difficult and highly specialized military art more than in the subjects most commonly addressed in civilian university postgraduate courses.*

But I would be the last to contend that such cited matters as the behavioral sciences, history and the use of language, are not of fundamental importance. And, of course, these can be, and are, taught at West Point.

I must take pretty vehement exception to the statement that I "overlooked such pertinent realities that professional soldiers spend only a fractional part of their military careers in combat." The inference here is equivalent to saying that since an astronaut will spend only a comparatively short time on the moon, he doesn't need much training for it, and so the months and years devoted to preparation are wasted.

The training of himself and his troops for combat is a continuing (and very time-consuming) prime responsibility of the military leader, else that "fractional part" of his career result in catastrophic failure—with possibly only local effect (a few hundred more dead soldiers), but possibly an effect measured in tens of thousands and the loss of a major campaign.

GEN. HAMILTON H. HOWZE
U.S. Army, retired
Fort Worth, Tex.

UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

■ I read with interest Gen. Hamilton H. Howze's "In Defense of Academic 'Ignorance' " in the June issue. His timely remarks touch on a very real problem, but they introduce many related questions which remain unanswered.

Criticism of junior officers who seek advanced degrees should be accompanied by positive ideas and programs explaining the current and future needs of an increasingly complex Army that has many roles. West Point is attempting to fulfill these roles—as it understands them. Certainly, today's Army cannot be compared to the Army that Lieutenants Eisenhower and Bradley and MacArthur knew. Perhaps more important, the society which the Army serves has vastly changed as well.

Some of the questions which must be addressed before an objective determination can be made on the Army's academic needs are: What will be the size and role of the Army of the future? Will there be a continued need for officers who "speak the language" of the young intellectuals in the Department of Defense? Is there now a need for the Army to have a more active part in shaping the nation's foreign and domestic policies? As the post-Vietnam national priorities turn to relieving poverty and rebuilding the cities, will the Army have a positive and active role in these social endeavors, or will we go back to cutting grass and playing football? Right now, there appears to be a lack of ideas on these and other related matters.

The Army is already seriously alienated from a great segment of American society. This, in itself, is strong argument for continued civil schooling of our officers.

MAJ. WILLIAM S. GRAF
Sun Prairie, Wis.

WHAT IS MILITARY VICTORY?

■ On 17 December 1944, I moved my unit, Combat Command B, 7th Armored Division, into the area of St. Vith, Belgium, on orders of my corps commander. The German main effort in the Ardennes offensive (Battle of the Bulge) was about to break through the U.S. defensive line there. We interposed our strength in front of this German effort and did not withdraw until 23 December, on order, so as to keep from being destroyed.

Field Marshal Hasso von Manteuffel, the German main effort commander, stated while visiting the United States in December 1964, that on the evening of 24 December 1944 he recommended to Adolf Hitler's adjutant that the German Army give up the attack and return to the Westwall. He said that the reason for this recommendation was the time lost by his Fifth Panzer Army in the St. Vith area which broke up the operation.

We of the 7th Armored Division suffered heavy losses and had to retreat. However, we accomplished our mission and spoiled the enemy's plans. To me that was a military victory.

Recently, a member of the U.S. Senate stated that *we* had lost the war in Vietnam. Having had three sons in Vietnam, and one there a second time, and having been privileged to visit the troops in the field during the Tet offensive of 1968, I violently object to such a statement if it refers to our armed forces in Vietnam. I do not consider that "we" includes them.

I am generally familiar with the conditions and missions that faced Gen. William C. Westmoreland in 1965 and later, and the conditions and missions facing Gen. Creighton W. Abrams since he took command; I can state that they have accomplished the military missions given them and have prevented the enemy from completing his. This, to me, is a military victory.

It is time we let our armed forces in Vietnam know that we apreciate their military victories.

We may have not won other types of victories, but that is not primarily the responsibility of the military.

GEN. BRUCE C. CLARKE
U.S. Army, retired
Arlington, Va.

ON CRITICS OF THE MILITARY

■ I would like to compliment your magazine for its articles dealing with the current ABM controversy and the war in Vietnam.

Although I have never served in the armed forces, I feel that many of the criticisms against the military are unjust. Many of our Congressmen are merely "hopping on the bandwagon" in order to gain a few votes among dissenters, instead of approaching the problems in a rational manner. Congress has not properly exercised its power of examining the budget of the Department of Defense. Many who cry out at excessive defense spending or at the "military-industrial complex" are the same people who wholeheartedly were in favor of increased spending so that their states could get defense contracts. So now why all the fuss?


I am not in favor of an all-volunteer army in this country, primarily because of the extent of our defense commitments throughout the world. Great Britain and Canada, which both have long and great military traditions, have had trouble finding volunteers to fill their ranks. Australia has had to reinstitute limited conscription.

I would like to see more articles concerning some of the other armies of the world—allied, communist and neutrals. An article describing the problems and benefits of unification of the armed forces, particularly in Canada and Israel, would be welcome.

JAMES J. SHERIN
Coraopolis, Pa.

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LETTERS

DETAILS OF DUC LAP

■ "The Battle of Duc Lap," by Capt. Joseph P. Meissner, in the May issue, gave a vivid and realistic portrayal of the six-day battle the North Vietnam Army waged to wrest control of the Duc Lap Special Forces camp and the Duc Lap Subsector from the hands of the few defenders. While the reporting was accurate in all details, many personal as well as unit actions were overlooked in order to stress details of the ground defense and counterattack phases.

One major point, of importance to our current plan of gradual withdrawal of troops, is the degree of training of the South Vietnamese and their ability to assume a greater role in the war effort without massive assistance from the United States and Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF). The battle of Duc Lap was the first time in this war that a Special Forces camp was successfully defended, and the relief of this camp was conducted solely by Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) companies and Mobile Strike Force companies advised by U.S. Special Forces. This in no way is meant to detract from the role played by tactical air support and artillery fire furnished by U.S. forces; however, at no time during this six-day battle were U.S. or FWMAF troops employed on the ground.

The command and control helicopter of Lt. Col. Ramon C. Reed, the B Team commander, was in fact used during the first day's battle for resupplying ammunition, water and food. However, no mention was made of SFC Busch, the B Team S2 sergeant who commanded the helicopter during its many resupply sorties, nor of the Air Medal with V device he earned that day for his courageous actions.

Tactical air support was outstanding; yet no mention was made of the loss of an F-100 at about 0915 hours on the first day and the subsequent rescue of the pilot by a group composed of Col. Reed, myself, M.Sgt. Boody, Sgt. Shepherd, four Special Forces advisors and five CSF soldiers, who travelled through some 1,500 meters of enemy-infested terrain to make the rescue. Lt. Thurn, USAF, the downed pilot, was back on station on the third day providing close tactical support.

Supporting helicopters, UH-1Ds, CH-47s and HueyCobra gunships were on station continuously, running the gantlet of intense enemy ground and anti-aircraft fire. Three times during the night of 24 August, medevacs were attempted, only to be driven off by intense enemy fire. Without the valiant efforts of these crews the insertion, resupply and medical evacuation of five Mobile Strike Force companies into the battle area could not have taken place.

Then, too, thanks are due to the swarm of engineers, signalmen, medical and preventive medicine troops who moved in after the battle to assist in rebuilding the camp.

Duc Lap again stands as a bulwark of defense against aggression.

ST.SGT.MAJ. BENJAMIN W. BARMORE
Republic of Vietnam


LESS THAN PERFECT EXAMPLE

■ I heartily agree with the message Maj. William V. Kennedy was trying to convey in "Army Studies Need Not Be Dull," in the June issue. I particularly liked some of the examples of technical gobbledegook he included. I did, however, find the article a less than perfect example of "effective communication," and somewhat "plagued wtih convoluted reasoning."

In singling out operations research studies as the main topic, Maj. Kennedy limited the scope of his article considerably from that implied by the title. The sudden deviation in the sixth paragraph from the discussion of Army writing to academic work put him outside the article's scope and does not fit well in the presentation. The sentence, "For one thing, there is no detailed standard pattern for an Army study, even as to the size of the paper on which it is to be printed," I would classify as somewhat "fog-bound."

The recommendation for expansion of the summary is contradictory to the recommendation that the study be written with special attention to the "known limitation on the reader's time." A well-written summary is the best means of conserving executive time. A properly written summary makes the reading of the entire text unnecessary unless specific knowledge of supporting detail is required. Writers who have a tendency to "run on seemingly forever" will do so, with or without a summary. "Expansion of the present summary and a condensation of the present text" would, I fear, lead to a verbose text that would be called a "summary" and reduce the "text" to an appended data summation. The overall effect would be a loss, rather than a gain, of the reader's time.

The misuse of "methodology" for "method" and, as mentioned in your editorial comment, of "personnel" for "people," are common examples of writing imperfections. However, it should be realized that the words "methodology" and "personnel" have meanings distinctly



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different from "method" and "people," and indiscriminate substitution of the latter two terms for the first two is not advisable.

I agree with Maj. Kennedy that "the step-by-step process through which a study passes is not necessarily the most desirable pattern in which to publish the findings"; however, "findings" are only a part of the study. If the findings are to be substantiated, a logical step-by-step development from basic known facts or assumptions, or both, through to conclusions and recommendations, must be presented. Only with that background information can the "action officer" decide on the efficacy of the recommendations. There is no reason why the development cannot be written in readable or even "compelling" prose, other than the lack of writing ability of the technical people concerned. Obviously, if the study is to be widely disseminated, changes in the method of presentation are apropos.

Whether the problem of improving the presentation of studies can best be accomplished through training, recruiting technical personnel with better writing abilities, or assigning an editorial staff to aid in the writing, is itself a fit subject for a study. One immediate remedy that suggests itself requires action on the part of "action officers"; that is, rather than "pigeonholing studies they find difficult to understand," they should insist on clarification to the point where a reasonable decision can be made. Any action officer who does otherwise is being derelict. In addition, the possibility exists that any particular study may be poorly written with the express objective of covering up the facts or confusing the issue, so that an unsupportable recommendation may be accepted, or action delayed. It is the responsibility of the action officer to uncover such subterfuges and assure himself that all relevant facts have been properly considered before he makes a decision.

When a study is considered for dissemination outside the normal channels, it should be turned over to an editorial staff for rework. When this is done, a final review responsibility still rests on the person (or persons) to whom the document is credited. He must assure that in putting the study into "compelling" prose, that editorial liberties are not taken which change the meaning of the content. In addition, he must be watchful that a gobbledegook-prone editor doesn't make the study less understandable.

The problem of producing studies which are not "dull" is far overshadowed by the one of turning out studies which are clear and to the point. I, for one, would be satisfied with studies that can be understood on the first reading.

Let's get this problem licked before we go on to making our studies literary masterpieces.

JOHN G. GEELHAAR
Fort Clayton, C.Z.

MORE FORRESTS, FEWER PH.D.'S?

■ I don't know if Maj. William V. Kennedy ("Army Studies Need Not Be Dull," June issue) has spent much time reading about ancient paperwork, but he has a case on the sesquipedalian verbiage which some of our writers grind out. Maybe he could have quoted that possibly true, maybe not, tale of Nathan Bedford Forrest's endorsement. One side of a sheet of paper bore an officer's request for leave, with all the courtly phrases of the day, "your obedient servant," and the like. The other side carried a short note in Forrest's jagged hand: "I told you twict, Goddammit, No." *Signed, N. Forrest.* Rude, but it carried the message.

Years ago, I sat in on a class held by a corporal with more schooling than sense, who read from a text used at West Point to a group of ammo handlers including two muscular and uneducated chaps who had trouble with plain English. He did for them as you might expect: Nothing. Explaining it in English they could dig never occurred to him.

Maj. Kennedy mentions lack of standardization in studies, manuals and the like. I'll go along with him. A large and unwieldy "field" manual is not a field manual. Compare the little DA pamphlet on the M16 rifle with the field manual on the same weapon. One is intended for use by the individual soldier, the other is for a bookcase or publications file. The little one will get the wear and tear, more often.

Gen. Howze's comments (in the same issue) on the doubtful relevance of an officer studying for degrees he may get no use from is well taken. One might recall a Civil War parallel. Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan was a learned person, and excellent in many military fields. Forrest was poorly educated and with no military training. McClellan's lack of decision overbalanced all his other gifts, and Forrest's instinctive drive and grasp of the problem offset his lack of schooling.

If we could scare up a batch of Forrests, we can use our educated types to make up for their crudeness, so long as we have the real hot leaders running the show.

But we can't see the Forrests for the Ph.D.'s.

SFC JOHN P. CONLON
Newark, Ohio

THE ROAD AT HAI VAN PASS

■ I was the infantry battalion commander responsible for the Hai Van Pass when the 35th Engineers arrived in the area. Consequently, I would like to point out several inaccuracies in the "Hai Van Pass" article in the June issue of ARMY.

The road was never "closed" by the VC. There were numerous instances of ambushes or attempted ambushes, mines and booby traps (including command detonated types), and natural hindrances such as rock slides, but the road was not closed.

The road was a paved (asphalt), two-lane highway that was simply "worn out in service" and incapable of handling the traffic required. Of course, the VC activity didn't help!

There are no "fortresses looking out to sea" along the road. The author is referring to the old French forts located strategically along the railroad which winds around and through the mountains between the Hai Van road and the sea.

The 35th was tasked with the stretch

Your AUSA

Did You Know . . .

The first four chapters and the first two AUSA ROTC companies were chartered during the Second Annual Meeting on 27 October 1956. The chapters were Fort Leonard Wood, Fort Leavenworth, Fort Riley and Fort Sheridan. Some of the names have been changed and the Fort Sheridan Chapter recently merged with the Chicago Chapter, but there has been no break in the chapters' service to the Association. The companies were Pennsylvania State University and Valley Forge Military Academy.

of road from Nam O to Phu Loc simply because the Marine Corps and Navy engineer units were vastly overcommitted. Likewise, the 101st Airborne's battalions were temporarily assigned the clearing operation in the mountains because of a paucity of Marine infantry units at that particular time.

The 35th did a splendid job. I certainly intend no disparagement, nor do I intend to degrade the magnitude of their accomplishment. This letter is simply to set the facts straight.

LT. COL. JOHN REILY LOVE
U.S. Marine Corps
FPO San Francisco 96610

THE DRAFT AND THE RESERVES

■ In all the talk about a volunteer army I never hear any reference to the reserve components. If the draft goes out will the National Guard and Army Reserve be able to keep up their strength?

We all know that it is the specter of Lt. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey and his greetings that creates a waiting list of men volunteering for the Guard and Army Reserve.

In the years between the end of the Second World War and 1955 or so, commanders of reserve components units spent most of their time hustling recruits. Hundreds of thousands of dollars were invested in expensive advertising and promotional programs for the same purpose. The results of these efforts were spectacularly disappointing. It was not only hard to get volunteers; it was difficult to keep them. Many reserve outfits were little more than collections of old timers serving out their time to earn retirement at age 60 and a few untrained recruits. As a result, training was stalled at the basic level. Personnel turnover made it impossible to conduct progressive training that would move a unit towards combat readiness.


Then came the Reserve Forces Act of 1955. This is the law that, among other things, provided that men who enlisted in the reserves would not be drafted into the active army and also provided for six months of basic training before assignment to a reserve unit.

RFA 55 rejuvenated the reserve components. It is safe to say, I think, that it made possible the finest peacetime (and Vietnam-wartime) reserve components in our history.

The day Selective Service is eliminated is the day the reserve components will begin to slide back into their former state of desuetude.

This is something to think about.


FORMER GUARDSMAN
Alexandria, Va.



What does UTC know about rocket propulsion? We're helping to rewrite the book.


Our business for the past decade has been rocket propulsion. ☐ Check our record. We are now producing the two giant solid-booster rockets and 16 small separation rockets that we developed for the Titan III-C. They've already been used in twelve launches and proved 100% reliable. And to date our versatile FW-4 solid rocket has placed 42 payloads in orbit as the upper stage of the highly successful Scout, Thor, and Delta space-launch vehicles. ☐ We developed the first hybrid propulsion system designed for operational use. The hybrid – combining solid and liquid technology – is capable of powering a variety of space vehicles and tactical missiles. It offers economy, in-flight throttling, long-term storage, and safe handling. Those are primary reasons why the hybrid has been chosen to power the Sandpiper missile. ☐ At UTC, these and a variety of other propulsion programs share an enviable record: proven performance, product reliability, and on-time delivery. ☐ For literature describing our broad capabilities in propulsion technology, send your request to: UTC, Dept. 0600, P.O. Box 358, Sunnyvale, California 94088.

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


1. Walks over bumps.

2. Swims through water.



3. Rolls on land.




4. Churns through mud.

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How do you get a wheeled vehicle to swim at 6½ mph, walk through deep mud and over rough terrain at similar speed, and roll over roads or hard ground at better than 30 mph—the nearest thing to universal surface mobility yet known?

First, you teach the wheel new tricks...putting wheels within wheels to form a unique locomotion concept that combines wheel, track and paddle advantages. You add a rugged, simple vehicle that has fewer controls and parts than most military conveyances. And you make it easy to operate through swamps and paddies, across deep waters, and over tortuous marginal terrain. In short, you create the highly agile Lockheed TerraStar.



This advanced vehicle was first independently developed by Lockheed Aircraft Service Company in Ontario, California, in response to U.S. Army needs for a new kind of tactical carrier—tough, fast and versatile, yet simple to drive and maintain. With unmatched amphibious, marginal terrain, and hard-surface capabilities, TerraStar is designed to give commanders a new high degree of tactical freedom and speed in such difficult combat zones as the South Vietnam deltas.

TerraStar's unique tri-wheel running gear makes it far more flexible than existing hybrid amphibians that can bog down in mud or make only snail-pace speed over roads. Each tri-wheel is an assembly of three separately driven "minor wheels" on secondary axles that



can revolve planet-fashion around a primary axle to form a "major wheel." On roads or hard ground, TerraStar rolls on the eight minor wheels bearing on the surface. A simple gear-shifting puts the vehicle into a major-wheel "walking" mode to negotiate mud, water, banks, dikes, bumps and ditches.

The TerraStar prototype—transportable by helicopter—can carry five fully armed combat soldiers, two NATO litters, or a 1,000-lb. minimum payload. Its locomotion design, however, is adaptable to a broad range of vehicle types and sizes.

How tough is it? In proving-ground tests, the U.S. Army Limited War Laboratory has put TerraStar through a mixture of gruelling obstacle courses no other vehicle has yet survived. Despite the severe punishment, TerraStar has taken each ordeal in stride and rolled away in sound shape.

The ability to understand present mission requirements and anticipate future ones, coupled with technological competence, enables



Lockheed to respond dependably to the needs of the Army in a changing world.

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Sesquicentennial of the Nation's Military-Industrial Complex

Early in 1819, before ordering Col. Henry Atkinson to St. Louis to lead a summer exploring expedition up the Missouri river, Secretary of War John C. Calhoun contracted with one James Johnson to provide the necessary supplies and equipment, including river steamboats of new design. Steamboats were as new in those days as the ABM is today, and any advance in design was, as today's jargon has it, "pressing the state of the art." When he arrived in St. Louis in July, Col. Atkinson found Johnson behind schedule on the boats and when delivered they proved, according to Francis Paul Prucha, Atkinson's biographer, "heavy, slow and improperly built for successful navigation of the Missouri. By September all of them had run aground, suffered mechanical breakdowns or halted because of low water."

Contractor Johnson's bill for the boats was higher than had been estimated. However, the War Department concurred in the overrun and asked the Congress for the necessary funds. The charges were excessive, angry congressmen retorted, and demanded an investigation. Almost surely some congressmen must have been overheard muttering about the military-industrial complex feeding wastefully on taxpayers. In its fury Congress reacted by slashing the military budget for 1820.

Here we digress to examine the soggy question of the greater evil.

Assuming that evidence (there appears to be none) pointed to a conspiracy to rook the government involving, let us say, Secretary Calhoun, Maj. Gen. Jacob Brown—the then senior officer in the Army—and contractor Johnson, would this evil deed be greater than the evil the Congress did to itself and the nation in legislating out of anger and in petulance?

We must suppose that the legislative body of a rational (and, therefore, prudent) society appropriates funds for a sensible reason: to provide for felt but unmet needs. If in its wisdom the Congress deemed that certain military programs were essential to the security of the nation, would it not be monstrously evil to refuse to appropriate funds for them because it was angry and suspicious of wrongdoing or irked at evidence of bad management by the defense establishment?

When mismanagement is proved, men can be stripped of high offices. When corruption is proved, they can be sent to jail. In either event, the presumption must be that the nation is made safer thereby. But a legislative body that acts irrationally risks placing the nation in greater peril.

The Congress is not without power in such situations. It can investigate and turn the hot lights of publicity on the alleged malefactors. It can make it the act of political wisdom for the President to ask for resignations. If it develops evidence of law-breaking it can bring pressures on the Attorney General to indict and prosecute. It can undertake to enact remedial legislation aimed at providing future safeguards. This latter process is not only rational, assuring the possibility of effective remedy, but the deliberate pace of such legislative efforts provides the therapy that will reduce the fevers that assail too petulant and self-righteous members of the Congress. This health-restoring aspect of parliamentary deliberations has been insufficiently recognized.

One hundred and fifty years have passed since contractor Johnson's expensive boats failed Col. Atkinson and the Congress vented its ire on the military budget. The analogy with today slaps you in the face. The military-industrial complex is under attack. More than a few members of the Congress—some of them, alas! feverish in the intensity of their suspicions—are concerned about the management of the defense establishment. If they seem not to expect to find many violations of the laws, they do seem to expect to find instances of waste, poor judgment and possibly favoritism. Investigation and exposure, followed by remedial legislation, are part of the rightful business of the Congress (it is what President Eisenhower in his famous warning said it should be doing), but if the fevered few so contaminate the majority that the reaction of the Congress is irrational in its treatment of the military budget, the kindest question that can be asked is, what have we learned about the art of government in the last 150 years?

JOHN B. SPORE □

In Defense of the Military Establishment

The presidency is a bully pulpit.
—THEODORE ROOSEVELT

Almost two months have passed since President Nixon uttered his ringing defense of the politically beleaguered military establishment, and nothing that has transpired since makes the message less timely or less necessary. As you will recall, the occasion was the commencement of the Air Force Academy at Colorado Springs.

"It is open season on the armed forces," Mr. Nixon told the graduating airmen. "You are under attack from those who question the need for a strong national defense and, indeed, see a danger in the power of the defenders."

He was bold in his description of the crisis: "Military programs are ridiculed as needless if not deliberate waste. The military profession is derided in some of the so-called best circles of America. Patriotism is considered by some to be a backward fetish of the uneducated and the unsophisticated."

The speech consisted of two related arguments. It asserted a defense of the military establishment from the angriest attacks since the Senator Gerald P. Nye "merchants of death" investigation of some 30 years ago, and it scornfully attacked the new isolationists who advocate "unilateral disarmament" and who would have the United States withdraw from the world.

"I say that America has a vital national interest in world stability, and no other nation can uphold that interest for us," he said. This "great nation," he added, has the resources and the strength to help create "a just world order that will bring about an end to war." He was abrasive, referring to the "skeptics and isolationists" as those who "have lost the vision indispensable to great leadership."

Some of his moderate supporters thought the references to the new iso-

Cyrus R. Vance to Receive Marshall Medal


Cyrus R. Vance, former secretary of the Army and deputy secretary of defense, has been named the 1969 recipient of the AUSA's George Catlett Marshall Medal for outstanding service to the nation. The annual award is the highest the association can bestow.

Mr. Vance, one of the most versatile public servants of recent years, will receive the award at the AUSA's annual Marshall dinner, 15 October. The presentation of the Marshall Medal is the premier event of the association's annual meeting.

Mr. Vance returned in February after nine months as deputy chief of the U.S. negotiating team at the Paris peace talks. In painstaking conversations with his North Vietnamese opposite number, Col. Hai Van Lau, Mr. Vance had a major part in settling the "table" dispute in January, opening the way to the broader talks now in progress.

Mr. Vance is now a partner in Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett, the New York law firm with which he has been associated since 1947, and which he has departed numerous times for government service.

Mr. Vance first came to the Department of Defense in 1961 as general counsel, where he served for 17 months, handling many major reorganization tasks in addition to his legal duties.



Cyrus R. Vance

He was sworn in as secretary of the Army on 1 July 1962, and remained at that post until 28 January 1964, when he moved up to deputy secretary of defense.

Mr. Vance's "retirement" from the DOD on 10 June 1967 marked the beginning of a tumultuous period in which he successfully fielded some of the toughest diplomatic and domestic assignments the nation could offer.

His first job as an administration "trouble shooter" came in July 1967, when he served as President Johnson's personal representative in the Detroit riots, heading the federal effort in the worst civil violence of five troubled summers. Mr. Vance unhesitatingly responded to a similar call in April 1968, when the nation's capital was wracked by rioting.

In November 1967, Mr. Vance undertook a special mission to the tense eastern Mediterranean as head of the U.S.-UN-NATO delegation which headed off a Greek-Turkish war over the Cyprus issue.

The North Korean seizure of the U.S. intelligence ship *Pueblo*, in February 1968, took Mr. Vance to Seoul, where he negotiated expansion of U.S. military aid with South Korean President Chung Hee Park.

Mr. Vance's knowledge of the Korean problem required his presence in Honolulu in April 1968—a few days after his service in the Washington riots—when President Johnson met with President Park. Shortly afterwards, on 10 May, Mr. Vance was given the Paris portfolio.

In recognition of his outstanding service during the previous eight years, Mr. Vance was awarded the Medal of Freedom, the nation's highest civilian award, on 20 January 1969.

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lationsists were divisive and therefore ill-advised. But the President could reply that anything he would say would not satisfy such congressional critics as Senators Fulbright and Gore or the "turned off" intellectuals. If he discounted their responses in advance, he could count on the agreement of the intelligent, disciplined and highly motivated young men who were his audience. Also, he could reasonably hope that his plea for sanity in criticism of the military and invocation of old-fashioned patriotism would elicit a favorable response from a majority of adult Americans. To what extent it succeeded was not measurable at the time nor is it now several weeks later. The creation of a political consensus is a slow process. By the time the pollsters can measure it, many of its origins are lost in the mists of time and not even the historically minded political scientists are able to rewrite the exact scenario.

The one segment of the population the President's message could not hope to capture were the draft-age young. At this time, appeals to unalloyed patriotism and reasoned appreciation of America's role in the world do not move the discontented young. Nor does evidence that the present leaders of the Soviet Union appear to be regressing into the bad old ways of Stalin and the latter-day tsars.

Such appeals make no impression on campus radicals and the moderates they can count on when the issues appeal to their sense of values. Spokesmen for these views deny that the communists are dangerous and that military strength in being is necessary if war is to be deterred and a peaceful world finally attained. Disarmament, not arms, will bring peace, they say, and they mean unilateral disarmament, since even they are realistic enough to know that their protests have no influence on Moscow, Peking and Hanoi. Some of them will tell you that they are deaf to such appeals as the President made at Colorado Sprngs because this is what they have been hearing all their lives and they quit believing it when they grew old enough to learn that adult TV programs were as much fairy tales as the cartoons and kid shows they grew up with. They are bright kids, and they can tell you a great deal more, too—about politicians who talk out of both sides of their mouths, and of a government that has not always been honest with its citizens. They are idealistic and they are

self-serving. Not many 20-year-olds are cynical, but the idealism of the present generation has a base of cool skepticism.

Anything the President could conceivably have said at the Air Academy that didn't abuse the respect of his audience could not have reconciled the young dissenters. That is unfortunate. But that the President chose, nevertheless, to speak out forcefully on the subject of America's role in the world and in behalf of the military profession as a prime instrument for carrying out that role was an act of presidential leadership for which we should all be grateful.

JBS □

A Quarter-Century Of The G.I. Bill

It's difficult to imagine any institution in this country which inspires such massive indifference in the alienated young as the G.I. Bill.

Seemingly a ripe topic for an orgy of anti-militarism, the veterans' "establishment" has thus far largely escaped concentrated attack from the radicals.

No doubt it will come.

But before we reach that acidulous stage of national debate, it might be well to reflect on this most visible of veterans' programs in the twenty-fifth year of its operation.

Perhaps one explanation for the failure of the G.I. Bill to excite the revolutionary passions of the radicals is the essentially inconspicuous way in which it has accomplished its works.

For this far-seeing legislation has been one of the principal architects of a social revolution which propelled an entire generation into prosperity.

More than 11 million veterans of World War II and Korea received some, or all, of their college or vocational training under the G.I. Bill—a large share of the trained minds which are our greatest economic resource. The value of the 7.4 million home, business and farm loans advanced under the bill totals $75 billion.

True, little of the $21 billion spent under the act has benefited that fifth of the population that has lived in poverty for generations; relatively few of their numbers have served in the armed forces. But the paradox of poverty amidst plenty would not seem nearly so acute today were it not for the works of the G.I. Bill.

Veterans Affairs Administrator Donald E. Johnson noted on the 25th anniversary of the act that the nation will likely recover its investment "many times over in the added taxes which these veterans pay on the increased earnings made possible. . . ."

But it is doubtful that the economic lesson had been fully absorbed by the Congress when the act was extended to Vietnam and cold-war-era veterans in 1967.

"We must convince these veterans," Mr. Johnson said, "that it is altogether right that they use their G.I. Bill benefits to serve their own best interests."

But it will take a lot of convincing, so long as the level of educational benefits remains much lower—in terms of real money—than that which supported Korean War veterans.

An unmarried Vietnam veteran is now eligible for $130 a month if he is a full-time student—the same as his Korean War counterpart of a decade ago. Many ex-soldiers now returning to school find this buys so little in today's inflationary economy that it is hardly worth their while.

The House veterans affairs committee has reported out a bill that would increase the basic monthly stipend to $165. The committee has requested that it be scheduled for floor action early in August.

ERIC C. LUDVIGSEN □

Once There Were Sally and Rose, But Now There's a Lady Known as Hannah

Remember the caressing voices of Rita Louisa Zucca, Mildred E. Gillars and Iva Toguri? Aging veterans of the second World War will.

Rita and Mildred were both known as "Axis Sally." Rita broadcast from Rome and Mildred from Berlin. Iva was "Tokyo Rose."

These three World War II American-born enemy propagandists have a present-day imitator, known as "Hanoi Hannah," who broadcasts nostalgic American music and chit-chat aimed at making the American fighting man in South Vietnam homesick and rebellious. She is no more successful, it appears, than were her sisters-in-seduction by radio.

Hannah's real name, we are told, is Thu Huong which, we are further told, translates into "Autumn Fragrance." Thu's voice is heard three hours a day over Radio Hanoi by those American soldiers who happen to tune her in. She is said to be a cheerful 30-year-old housewife and mother of two children. We are told that she wears baggy pants and rides to work on a bicycle. Her husband reportedly is a minor bureaucrat in North Vietnam.

Unlike her second World War predecessors there is no evidence that Hannah has any American ties.

Rita Zucca was the daughter of a New York restaurateur, but she seems to have been granted Italian citizenship some years before the end of the war. She was arrested in Turin in June 1945 by American soldiers and turned over to the Italians. A few months later an Italian military tribunal sentenced her to 4½ years in prison. A year later an Italian court granted her amnesty and set her free.

Mildred Gillars, who was said to be from Portland, Me., was arrested by American Military Government in Berlin in March 1946 and was released without trial in December of the same year.

Tokyo Rose was believed to be an American nisei. She was arrested by American soldiers in the fall of 1945 and charged with treason. But in October 1946 she was released for lack of evidence.

Our information about Hanoi Hannah came to us through a practice known as Tinkers to Evers to Chance journalism. We got the information from the magazine *Interplay*, which got it from the *London Evening Standard*, which credits it to *Verde Olive*, described as a "journal of the Cuban revolutionary forces." Where Castro's boys got the information isn't revealed. We can only say that any publication that picks this up from us has an involved job of credit-giving on its hands.

The Mohawk: A Revolution In Aerial Observation

Back in the mid-1950s, when the artillery-spotting lightplane was our idea of an Army aircraft, weapons planners were already looking ahead to the day when ground commanders would directly control some vital non-airpower elements of aviation: battlefield reconnaissance, local resupply, aerial troop movements.



One of the most spectacular and enduring successes of that early effort was the OV-1 Mohawk combat surveillance aircraft, now nearing the end of its first decade of service with Army aviation units.

Capable of operating in all kinds of weather from the rudest fields, the Mohawk and its sophisticated array of surveillance systems have given commanders in Vietnam near-instantaneous intelligence of an elusive enemy.

It was in 1957 that the Army announced work in progress on a new high performance observation aircraft. The development contract had been awarded to the Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp., a firm with a long and proud history as builders of aircraft for the U.S. Navy. The first Mohawk prototypes rolled out at Grumman's plant at Bethpage, N.Y., proved worthy of the tradition which created the great carrier-based naval air fleets. Production began in 1959, and the Army Aviation School, Fort Rucker, Ala., took delivery of the first production Mohawk in September 1960.

The triple-finned OV-1, with its twin Lycoming gas turbine engines of 1,150 equivalent shaft h.p. each, was designed from the start as a high performance aircraft.

The Mohawk is, in fact, the first observation aircraft in widespread use to perform equally well at both ends of the speed range. In the late 1930s, the Army Air Corps had ordered fleets of high-speed corps- and army-level observation aircraft, but poor low-speed performance limited their value to units in the field, and the whole class was dumped on the eve of World War II. The lightplanes that followed were short on speed and crew protection.

But the Mohawk design benefitted from new developments in short take-off and landing (STOL) technology, combining low- and high-speed characteristics. The OV-1 can take off over a 50-foot obstacle in 890 feet, and landings have been made in as little as 300 feet, with maximum braking and fully reversed propellers. The Mohawk is most at home close to the deck, and this excellent low-altitude performance drastically reduces vulnerability to ground fire.

Armor-plating, self-sealing fuel tanks, removable flak curtains, a bulletproof windshield and ejection seats provide unsurpassed crew protection.

At 41 feet in length, and with a 42-foot wingspan, the Mohawk is not a large aircraft—about the size of some World War II fighters. In the OV-1A version, top speed is around 300 knots, cruising speed is 200 knots, service ceiling is 25,000 feet and fastest rate of climb is 2,950 feet per minute. The OV-1A weighs 9,910 pounds empty, 12,500 pounds loaded, including 1,930 pounds of fuel. External fuel tanks can extend the range to about 800 miles.

But the heart of the Mohawk is the photographic and electronic sensory devices which transform it from just another aircraft into a complete battlefield surveillance system, capable of gathering intelligence at any time of the day or night and transmitting it almost instantly.

The Mohawk has so far been produced in three basic configurations, each tailored to the mission at hand.

The OV-1A is the basic visual observation and photographic ship, mounting cameras for both oblique and vertical photography. In Vietnam, the 1A has often been armed with wing-mounted rockets and machine guns, since it is employed most often in daylight at low altitudes.

The OV-1B version is distinguished by the cigar-shaped fiberglas pod that houses the antenna for its sidelooking airborne radar (SLAR). This radar permits wide search of large areas on both sides of the flight path, day or night and in bad weather.

In the OV-1C, the SLAR is replaced by an infrared surveillance system, which has proved especially effective in monitoring enemy infiltration routes at night.

Both the 1B and 1C carry the normal array of cameras, and all three models can be equipped with an LS-59 electronic flasher, which produces short bursts of high-intensity light for night photography.

Scheduled to go into production in September is the OV-1D, the definitive version of the Mohawk, which has been designed for rapid interchangeability of the surveillance equipment. Two additional access doors, and two more wing hard points greatly simplify maintenance of the equipment and allow more wing stores to be carried.


The SLAR and infrared systems are packaged, and can be swapped in the field in one hour's time.

The OV-1D also has an improved photographic system, with a second KA-60 camera mounted in a vertical position, in addition to the forward-looking one in the nose, giving both oblique and vertical panoramic coverage. The KA-30 camera of the earlier Mohawks will be replaced by a KA-76, with four different lens cones and automatic exposure controls.

The OV-1D was designed to a February 1967 requirement, and the first flight of the pre-production model took place in August 1968.

Mohawks are currently in service with Army units all over the world. They are organic to the airmobile division, and serve in aerial surveillance and target acquisition (ASTA) platoons and aerial surveillance companies. The platoons and companies are normally assigned at corps and army, but may be attached to divisions or smaller units, as the situation requires.

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They Said . . .

The Apt and Significant From Rostrum and Page

James Reston
Executive Editor, The N.Y. Times

Presidents have the power to change the direction of policy but not always the power to control the speed of the machine once it has been set in motion. When you sue for peace, it is hard to explain why young men die while the old men talk. When some units are withdrawn from the battle, it is not quite so easy to maintain the zeal of the units that have to go on fighting for limited and ambiguous goals.

The New York Times, 27 June 1969.

John A. Burns
Governor of Hawaii

Many people in the United States today, including young and eager students, are terribly unfair in attributing to their own native land and its leaders all the injustice and cruelty and horror of this war. I would hope that in their zeal, they would add to their projects of protest some tough assignments that would *really* test their honesty, their courage, their political ability and their public relations skill. Let them tear down the Berlin Wall as they tear up our educational institutions. Let them confront Ho Chi Minh and demand he halt the killing, as they now confront American university presidents. Let them pay for full-page ads in national newspapers, demanding that the Viet Cong seek peace with their American and South Vietnamese brothers, through a unilateral Viet Cong cease-fire. Let them end their racial and national prejudices and blindness in blaming only Americans for all the burning, killing, cruelty, and agony in Vietnam. Let them place the blame where it truly belongs. Let them use the blunt language of student rebels and of Army men in times of stress—let them blame those who have steadfastly refused all pleas for peace, and who seek absolute control of the bodies and minds of all Vietnamese as their price for a peaceful Southeast Asia.

Address to Hawaii Chapter, AUSA, 19 May 1969.

Melvin R. Laird
Secretary of Defense

In 1939, the year World War II began, the nation spent only one percent of its gross national product for defense. As a result, we were in no position to prevent the catastrophe that Hitler brought upon the world nor were we in any position to fight effectively for a year or more after Pearl Harbor. Obviously, we did not truly save by keeping defense spending low in the 1930s. All the financial 'savings' of a decade evaporated in one month's war time spending—not to mention 1 million Americans killed and wounded in the course of the war.

Address at Arlington, Va., 14 May 1969.

Rep. William G. Bray
(Rep., Indiana)

"Boys" this. "Boys" that. Boys? Boys are being scouted by college football coaches; boys are sinking hook shots from center court; boys are thinking of the senior prom. We have men—in capital letters, MEN in Vietnam! They wade leech-infested rivers; they hang from the doors of helicopter gunships; with no more protection than a Red Cross on their helmets, they charge into machine-gun fire to reach the wounded. It is sometimes difficult to say when a boy becomes a man, but there is one time that no one can doubt; when he puts on the uniform of his country, when he wears this uniform into battle, and when this same uniform is soaked with his blood or with that of his comrades.

Editor & Publisher, 14 June 1969.

Robert L. Bartley
Staff Writer, Wall Street Journal

With Secretary [of Defense Melvin R.] Laird carrying the Administration case, the emphasis has not been on a stable arms race, but on building more weapons to ensure maximum protection from the Soviets. . . .

The most prominent opponents of the ABM, for their part, mirror this image. They seem not so much against any particular weapon as against weapons, period. Things like the Soviet threat or how a particular weapon will affect the nuclear balance don't greatly matter. A defensive and quite plausibly stabilizing ABM is as convenient a symbol as an offensive and patently destabilizing MIRV. . . .

ABM opponents couple this attitude with a lot of talk about "breaking the action-reaction." This code-talk seems to translate: The only reason the Soviets develop nuclear weapons is because the U.S. does; if the U.S. stops, the Soviets will too. Thus, behind the crusade seems to lurk a philosophy that, if not exactly unilateral disarmament, is not in principle greatly different from it.

Wall Street Journal, 9 July 1969.

The HLHS What will it take?

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
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
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
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Our ability to destroy the enemy once outstripped the means of finding him, but STANO is giving the battlefield commander the intelligence he needs in time for him to use it.



Narrowing The Combat Intelligence Gap

By Lt. Gen. Harry W. O. Kinnard

At the end of World War II, the Army made significant improvements in its firepower by developing several new weapons and munitions. In the early 1960s, it enhanced its mobility by adopting the helicopter and the airmobile concept. At the same time, great strides were made in command and control through improved communications equipment and automatic data processing. Support services, which include logistical services, have also been considerably modernized. However, in comparison to improvements in firepower, logistics, mobility and communications, the Army has lagged in developing the fifth element of land combat—intelligence.

The war in Vietnam has provided a stimulus for developing several devices used in detection and surveillance on the battlefield. Detection becomes a major problem in an unconventional war like the one in Vietnam. In conflicts of higher intensity it may well be the key to survival.

When I took the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) to the Republic of Vietnam in 1965, I knew that finding the enemy would be one of our toughest jobs. It occurred to me that perhaps we would be able to identify the guerrilla—a farmer by day and a fighter by night—by the dark circles under his eyes. As things turned out, one of our best means of intelligence was just about that unsophisticated, and terribly unnerving for our pilots. Pilots scouted the area in helicopters until the enemy revealed his presence by firing at them. Many major battles began in just that way.

Of course, the 1st Cavalry Division had other means of surveillance, ranging from foot patrols to electronic intercept and side-looking radars. We used them quite effectively but, in looking back, we see that our ability to find the enemy did not match our battlefield mobility and firepower. Since then, the gap has been narrowed somewhat by the development and use in Vietnam of devices such as the "people sniffer," the starlight scope and improved front-line surveillance radar.

But equipment alone does not necessarily improve the Army's capability. Devices used in surveillance and target acquisition must be matched with doctrine that prescribes

their employment and a capability for processing information that will rapidly convert raw information into usable intelligence. The cycle is completed only when the resulting intelligence is transmitted and displayed to the troops who must engage the target or the enemy's forces. In short, our biggest job is to bring all the information gained through devices and human means into a system—including the front-line soldier—that gives the battlefield commander the intelligence he needs and in time for him to act or react.

The verbs *collect, process, transmit, display, act,* and *react* suggest the magnitude of the problem, which is not a new one. It is as old as the art of war. Nor are the recognition of the problem and our attempts to solve it new. Our army has come a long way since the days of the Indian scout, in both its ability to gather intelligence and its ability to react to it. Intelligence is a function in which the demand, and the development of the capacity to serve that demand, constantly stimulate each other and generate new and higher degrees of sophistication and capability. Today, we again face a great expansion in intelligence technology, an expansion that springs from a combination of new demands and technological developments.

During the past few years, several programs have been undertaken to meet the demands of our forces stationed throughout the world. These concern such diverse things as security of border barriers, the mobile army sensor system, and the orderly integration of the system of surveillance, target acquistion and night operations (STANO). Each of these has contributed to our capability.

At Combat Developments Command we recently set up Task Force Riposte to bring under a single effort within CDC the responsibility for planning and monitoring the integration in the Army of all devices used in surveillance, night vision and target acquisition. Riposte's mission is to validate requirements for equipment, write doctrine for its use and place it within the Army's tables of organization and equipment (TOE). Riposte will also evaluate field and troop tests of devices and concepts.

Our approach to the task is through two major objectives. The short-range objective is to speed developments to meet the urgent needs of our forces in Southeast Asia. The longer-range objective is to provide improvements in the combat intelligence system for world-wide use that employs the most effective mixture of equipment for collection, data linkage, processing and display.

The principal aim in the short-range objective is to fill voids and gaps in the ability at any echelon to meet a combat commander's information needs, at the same time avoiding costly overlaps. First generation equipment, now rapidly entering the Army's inventory, is backed up with doctrine for its employment. This equipment includes improved radar, night vision devices and sensors which reveal the presence of the enemy through physical agents such as heat, light, pressure, sound motion and chemical or electromagnetic variations.

Properly programmed, the short-range effort will enhance the longer-range plan to develop the needs for a second generation of equipment targeted for the Army up through 1985. Improvements in the first generation of materiel are clearly predictable in such features as weight, range, reliability, compatibility and automation. For the first time, these improvements offer the possibility that our forces will be able to carry out continuous operations, employing a full 24-hour combat capability, by extending the fighting into conditions of poor visibility and darkness, at near-daylight effectiveness.

So far, much of the drive for development has come from our objectives to improve our defensive capability. The greatest potential value of STANO lies in exploiting its offensive capabilities as the means to gain decisive results in combat. Offensive operations allow the combat commander to retain the initiative; they give him the flexibility he needs to strike the enemy at his most vulnerable point in time and space. Further, by coordinating his collecting capabilities with his means of fire support, the commander can control areas that are not occupied by his troops—an application of the principle of economy of force.

Battlefield reconnaissance, essential as it is, can reveal only what is in an area up to the time a reconnaissance takes place. On the other hand, sensors placed in the same area by reconnaissance troops, or by other means, can give the commander permanent surveillance at a very low risk.


We realize that during our studies many human factors must be constantly weighed. Very real matters such as combat fatigue and psychological processes bear heavily, so we don't profess to have all the answers. Scientists can build many capabilities into equipment; only people can make use of those capabilities. That is why we feel that doctrinal considerations and developments must guide advances in materiel, not the opposite.

The situation of the Army is necessarily one of constant change. That is why we must constantly bring our doctrine up to date. At Combat Developments Command we consider a doctrinal study to be one that translates an operational concept into a clearly defined, tactically sound arrangement of materiel, manpower and operational capability. A doctrinal study must have a valid objective and provide a solution to a problem. Desirably, it also provides guidance for budgeting in the programming of resources. Not only must we establish needs for materiel and manpower, including MOS training; methods of employment must be published in field manuals or other doctrinal literature, and the TOE must be worked out.

Many considerations enter into the organization for continuous operations. For example, is it advisable to organize and equip one unit for night operations, and another for daytime fighting, somewhat like the two-platoon system in football? We must remember, of course, that, unlike the gridiron, the battlefield has no sidelines that are safe from attack. Or might we enhance the soldier's powers of endurance through stimulants? I am not suggesting that either of these is a practical solution; I mention them only to suggest that there is considerable ground to be explored in human research.

Human actions in the intelligence function also offer a

LT. GEN. HARRY W. O. KINNARD (USMA, 1939), has been commanding general, Combat Developments Command, since 1 July 1967. In February 1963 he took command of the 11th Air Assault Division which tested the air mobility concept. This unit became the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), which he took to Vietnam in July 1965. Later, in Vietnam, Gen. Kinnard commanded Field Force I.



Lt. Gen. Harry W. O. Kinnard, CG, Combat Developments Command, tries out a Starlight Scope at the Night Vision Laboratory, Fort Belvoir, Va.

fruitful area for exploration. Our equipment can alert us to the presence of people, but it cannot tell us which side they are on. Blips on a screen can indicate presence and even numbers, but only humans can reveal intentions. Our ability to extract information from the enemy is still somewhat crude. Our combat elements are often confronted with opportunities to gather intelligence from prisoners or local inhabitants which are not fully exploited because of lack of interrogators whose knowledge of the language is good enough to unlock the needed information. This effort is also limited—and properly so—by international agreements. Human actions in intelligence can be modernized through the use of technology and better understanding and application of the behavioral sciences.

Drawing on our experiences of the past, we realize that advancements in firepower and mobility have come through newly developed materiel; however, a higher combat capability was realized only when the materiel was integrated with new concepts of operation, organization, training and logistical support. Thus, we can conclude that the recent proliferation of equipment for surveillance, target acquisition and night observation (STANO) offers an opportunity for significant gains in continuous operations and in the intelligence function of land combat.

The introduction of first generation STANO equipment into the conflict in Vietnam has been encouraging, and has done a lot to narrow the intelligence gap. Likewise, some of this equipment is proving useful in Korea, where infiltration from the north is a constant threat. These considerations were instrumental in the decision to create within CDC an agency to plan and monitor the integrated introduction of STANO capabilities into the Army. The principal means for developing these capabilities is a series of operational evaluations in the combat zones.

Concurrently, the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command's Experimentation Command is running a series of field experiments in the highly instrumented, controlled environment of Hunter Liggett Military Reservation, where soldiers and scientists are coming to grips with the problems.

Other agencies, such as Army Materiel Command's Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM), the Night Vision Laboratory, the Human Engineering Laboratory and the Behavioral Science Research Laboratory, are attacking various facets of the matter. The objective of this intensive and extensive testing of STANO is to produce or collect data on doctrine, organization, tactics, training and materiel.

These laboratory and field experiments will determine human performance, fatigue, operator selection and techniques, and technical support factors relating to STANO capabilities and developments. Continental Army Command will incorporate the results into a training program.

Under its charter, CDC is charged with integrating STANO capabilities into the present and future Army. Obviously, AMC and CONARC have a continuing part in this undertaking. Interactions among these three commands, as well as the overseas commands that are affected, are close and constant.

In viewing any new system, it is first necessary to determine the variables in the tasks to be performed. If the system is to be applied Army-wide, then it must be viewed in differing environments, at all intensities of conflict. In viewing the functions of combat, it appears that while STANO is oriented principally to the intelligence function, it also affects mobility, firepower, command and control and, to a lesser degree, the support services. Thus, we use a "program matrix," or mold, as a management tool. This places all elements of the system against the demands of task, function and intensity of conflict. Besides, no system can be viewed in isolation: its relation with other systems must be considered. For example, target acquisition subsystems linked through automation to the tactical fire direction system (TACFIRE) may significantly improve the accuracy and effectiveness of firepower. Surveillance and night operations subsystems logically would have an effect on the tactical operations system (TOS) to improve our means of disseminating operational information and intelligence. Ideally, a battlefield commander would have an accurate and contemporaneous display of the situation of the friendly unit and that of the enemy, including target intelligence and counterintelligence.

Even a partial listing of tasks would be lengthy, but within each level of conflict intensity, some tasks stand out. In conflicts of low intensity, characterized by much of the action in Vietnam, detection of enemy movements and positions in jungle terrain during darkness and poor weather is a formidable task. Also, identifying the enemy who mingles with and uses local people as a cover is very difficult. Current STANO equipment is improving our ability to do these tasks, and new materiel offers us the capability to overcome one of the greatest difficulties in that conflict.

In conflicts of medium intensity, like World War II and Korea, accurate intelligence of enemy means of delivering fire is desired in enough detail to permit their neutralization. Also, the positions and movements of enemy reserves from deep in the rear must be detected early, to permit interdiction and counter-maneuver.

In conflicts of high intensity, priority must go to locating and destroying enemy nuclear stockpiles and means of delivery. Besides, intelligence that will give some warning of a nuclear strike can permit our forces to take protective measures that will enhance their chances of survival.

The continued equipment of the Army with aircraft is

greatly expanding the size of the area over which a commander must maintain surveillance. In past wars, battalions fought along relatively narrow frontages, and even our fastest mounted forces measured movements in terms of kilometers and hours. Today, with the mobility provided by the helicopter, our ground forces range over dozens of kilometers in minutes.

In our studies for the Army of 1970-75, it became apparent that intelligence capability had lagged behind the other elements of combat. Many of the materiel systems discussed in this and other issues of ARMY have resulted from attempts to close this gap. During the past two years, a concept of organization for combat intelligence has been studied, a modification of which was combat-tested by a combat intelligence battalion in the 1st Infantry Division in Vietnam.

This study, labeled Target Acquisition and Combat Surveillance in Vietnam (TACSIV II), served to validate or disprove many theoretical claims. One conclusion of the study is that perhaps a company-sized unit is needed in divisions to handle intelligence.

In brigades and battalions, smaller battlefield information centers are needed to help the S2 process, and to produce and disseminate intelligence. Future TOE will reflect these additions. This unit would furnish assistance needed by the division G2 and the brigade and battalion S2 by providing battlefield information control centers to coordinate the collection of information, to process and disseminate intelligence, and to furnish dedicated communication circuits.

Finally, the problems of surveillance, target acquisition and night operations have been recognized, and many are well on the way to solution. These solutions will not come free, so we must carefully weigh the trade-offs. Far-reaching decisions must be made on how much of our resources of materiel and manpower should be expended to gain better and more timely information about the enemy. Solutions to many of the problems call for highly sophisticated and costly equipment, with the associated high cost in training troops. During our study we must weigh these factors and the relative merits and faults of trying to gain an improved intelligence capability at the expense of other needs. Our objective is a proper balance within the limits of our resources. I am convinced that a combination of technology and ingenuity will bring us to that objective.

▲

No Miller's?

Proud advertisement near a riverside water point in Vietnam: "The champagne of Potable Water."

CAPT. DAVID L. BODDE

▲

Caught in the Crossfire

The only delaying action I saw in World War II came about when I was caught in the crossfire of a marital conflict.

A sergeant in my platoon, a pugnacious young fellow of Irish descent, had taken himself a bride of like lineage and spirit. Their honeymoon began with an argument and culminated in hand-to-hand combat. They thrived on it.

Shortly before we shipped out for Hawaii, early in 1943, he brought his sparring partner by to visit me and my wife at our tourist cabin in Pismo Beach, Calif. I never saw a happier or more evenly matched pair. They got into three or four heated arguments about names and dates and places. They were hardly speaking when they left. But you could tell they were hooked for keeps.

In Hawaii I became our unit mail censor. Included in this daily stint was the ordeal of reading the letters from the sergeant to his wife. They were dull and repetitious, but strictly GI—easy to censor. He always told her to write home to Mom, to be sure to change the oil in the car, and to take good care of herself—in that order.

Her letters were just the opposite: long, fiery, and indignant. She ate him out royally for never saying anything. One day he came to my tent and said, "Lieutenant, I can't take it any more. She won't believe I'm not allowed to say nothing. So I've written a letter with all the wrong things in it. When you cut them all out with your razor, that'll show her for good."

So I carved many little windows out of the letter, eliminating all the military secrets. The remains looked like a piece of old Irish lace. Surviving were just enough permissible phrases to hold the paper together.

"That'll show her," the sergeant crowed, licking the envelope and heading for the company mail room.

After mail call a couple of weeks later, I saw him bee-lining toward my tent. His face was beaming. "It worked, Lieutenant," he said. "Read this part here."

It went like this: "Forgive me, darling, for the nasty things I said about your letters. I know what you're up against. Yesterday I got a real nice one, but it was cut to pieces. You wouldn't believe it. Nothing left but the part about writing to Mom and changing the oil. I guess the lieutenant did that—and after me thinking he was different. He seemed real nice that evening at Pismo Beach, but I guess he's just like all the rest."

The sergeant took the letter from me. "Ain't that something?" he exclaimed. "You don't win many from Letty, but I reckon we really showed her this time, didn't we, Lieutenant?"

LT. COL. FRANK F. RATHBUN
USAR, retired

15TH ANNUAL MEETING


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
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(Print or type) (Rank or title of position)

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
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For centuries, armies floundered in the darkness, and the tactical advantage belonged to him who learned to use its cover. Now, the balance is being righted by a new generation of devices which reveal as much of the enemy as they conceal the observer.

NIGHT THE BACK ROLLING



By Robert G. McClintic

More than a century ago, military theorist Karl von Clausewitz said that "a great part of the information obtained in war is contradictory, a still greater part false, and by far the greatest part, somewhat doubtful."

The U.S. Army has made great strides in solving the information problem since that statement was made, yet today, even more so than in the past, the need for personal and unit alertness in intelligence matters is of primary concern to the military establishment.

The Army now has weapons that can destroy the enemy whenever and wherever he appears on the battlefield, but the demand for timely and accurate location of targets for these weapons is one of today's major problems. It is impossible to intelligently employ troops in combat without first acquiring information on the enemy, the terrain and the weather.

A commander must know where his enemy is. He must know the enemy's strength. He must know the kind of weapons the enemy has. He must know if the enemy is dug in and is ready to hold and fight or if he is set to attack.

The success of the commander's mission depends upon the timeliness and accuracy of the combat intelligence at hand. Knowledge of the enemy, the weather and the terrain, through both strategic and combat intelligence, is a key to success in combat.

To keep a constant, prompt and accurate vigil over the battlefield, the Army employs both ground and aerial surveillance which includes visual observation, infrared, radar, sensors, photography and new night-vision devices. Capabilities in all these fields are being constantly expanded and integrated.

The U.S. military units in Vietnam depend heavily upon combat surveillance to maintain total responsiveness to accomplish their assigned missions. They well realize that the four keys to victory lie in the infantry's ground rules—the four F's: find 'em, fix 'em, fight 'em, finish 'em.

The soldier in Vietnam is vitally concerned with the "find 'em" capability. He is fighting an enemy who knows the terrain like the back of his hand. He is fighting in jungles where vision is limited to a few feet; and the night has always belonged to the enemy when he is fighting in his own back yard. So, the U.S. soldier in Vietnam is having his troubles in finding the enemy, much less in finishing him.


To get the job done, the American soldier employs four tools of modern warfare: combat surveillance, reconnaissance, target acquisition and night vision. What do these terms mean to the Army?

- Surveillance is a constant, all-weather, day-and-night systematic watch over the battle area that provides timely information for tactical operations.
- Reconnaissance is a specific mission undertaken to obtain information of a particular area or enemy activity.
- Target acquisition detects, identifies, and locates a target in enough detail to permit analysis of it and the effective employment of weapons to destroy it.
- Night vision is the key to the more meaningful and extensive employment of night operations.



The U.S. Army relies on its knowledge of combat surveillance, night vision, target acquisition and reconnaissance to obtain adequate intelligence to close with and defeat the enemy. But the cover of darkness has hampered armies throughout history. Darkness has always provided a tactical advantage for one side or the other, and the earliest efforts on record to remove this cover were through the use of flares and rockets. As far back as World War I, formal research was begun in night vision, but until the 1930s it was confined to illumination by searchlight.

In the early 1930s, research by industry led to the development of a television picture tube which could be used to convert infrared images to visible displays. The military significance of this was quickly recognized by the U.S. Army, where further development resulted in the now-famous sniperscope of World War II. During that war, the Army's night-vision ability was expanded to include not only battlefield illumination (mainly by searchlights) and near infrared, but far infrared as well. Also, during World War II, radar and other electronic devices



The Mohawk, the mainstay of aerial combat surveillance in Vietnam. In this OV-1C configuration, the aircraft carries infrared equipment to detect the enemy at night, as well as the normal array of cameras.

gave the Army the capability of penetrating the veil of darkness to find the enemy.

Today, the Army has made even greater achievements in the field of night vision. Revolutionary new devices which turn darkness into daylight for U.S. forces have taken the cover of night from the enemy. Infrared equipment carried by the Army's OV-1C Mohawk and a new family of sensors that can be hand-placed and air-dropped along trails, in the jungle and along countryside in Vietnam also can detect the enemy at night.

The new night-vision devices—the small starlight scope, AN/PVS-2; the crew-served weapon sight, AN/TVS-2; the medium-range night observation device, AN/TVS-4—which make it easier to detect enemy forces moving under the blanket of darkness, have been used by U.S. troops in Vietnam for more than a year and are considered a major factor in our military effectiveness there.

Called "first-generation night-vision devices," they somewhat resemble regular telescopes, and range from hand-held models to larger, tripod-mounted sights for general surveillance. Fundamentally different from other kinds of surveillance equipment, including radar and infrared, they intensify moonglow, star shine and even faint skyglow some 40,000 times.

The night-vision program is being carried out in the Army Electronics Command's Night Vision Laboratory at Fort Belvoir, Va., an agency of the Army Materiel Command.

In the early stages of U.S. commitment to combat in Vietnam, the military axiom that night operations are essential to successful insurgent warfare had proved especially true. During daylight hours, aggressive patrols, aerial surveillance and sophisticated weapons denied the enemy considerable freedom of movement. After darkness had settled, however, the enemy's operational capacity resumed practically unhindered.

ROBERT G. McCLINTIC is an information specialist at the headquarters of Army Materiel Command. A combat veteran of World War II and Korea, he retired from the Army in 1964 after a number of tours with information staffs throughout the world. He also is a former associate editor of ARMY *and of the* Journal of the Armed Forces.

In war, victory is not always to the strong and the swift; it is also to those who can find 'em fastest. Finishing 'em comes later.

Traditional methods of detecting enemy movements at night have been by means of flares, searchlights and infrared devices. Detection was often followed by the pounding of large areas by artillery. All these methods of viewing have some drawbacks, especially insofar as they are active methods of viewing and, as such, are easily detected and are thus of limited value in deployment.

Light from flares reveals as much of friend as of foe and fails to effectively penetrate heavy rain forest. Searchlights, too, have limited use and also reveal the position of the user. Standard infrared systems can be detected and are therefore not totally secure.

The development of a family of three passive night-vision devices that could intensify images offered a radical solution to this problem. These new devices were passive, in that their use was undetectable because they did not project energy out of a target as had earlier methods of viewing, such as the infrared light sources. Instead, intensifier devices amplify the light which exists in the night but which cannot be seen by the human eye, so that a clear image is projected. The result is that the output light image is more than 40,000 times clearer than the original. This principle was used in developing the three new night-vision devices.


Until the deployment of the first generation of image intensified night-vision devices, reports filtering back from Vietnam said that "the night belongs to Charlie." Today, thanks to the new night-vision devices, U.S. troops have begun taking the night away from the VC. These devices have helped to repel sneak nighttime attacks; they have provided our soldiers with "eyes" while the enemy remains blind; and they have given the individual soldier alone in the jungle at night the psychological advantage of confidence in himself and his equipment.


Before the coming of night vision devices, C. A. Fowler, deputy director of the Tactical Warfare Program in the office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, in referring to our staggering ordnance consumption rates and costs in Vietnam, said:

"The quantity of weapons is large because of our inability in many cases to detect and accurately locate the target, thereby requiring a buckshot or saturation approach. . . . If we are to obtain a capability to operate during the darkness with the same ability we have during daylight we would not merely double our effectiveness but would increase it by a factor of five to ten or even more because of the present concentration of activity during darkness.

"In many situations, even when we have actively lo-








Light-gathering starlight scopes have revolutionized the Army's night vision capability in Vietnam. The largest and longest-ranged of these, at upper right, is used with or without tripod, and can detect the enemy at ranges up to 12,000 meters on the strength of moonlight, starlight or faint skyglow. At upper left is a crew-served weapons sight, based on the same system, mounted on a 106-mm. recoilless rifle. Starlight optics produce remarkably clear images, as at left, intensifying available light in the user's area up to 40,000 times. Shown below is the small model, hand-held or mounted on individual infantry weapons, including the M14 and M16 rifles, M60 machine gun, M67 recoilless rifle, M72 rocket launcher and M79 grenade launcher.

cated the target, we do not have the systems to effectively counter it. . . . True nighttime capability will be realized when detection is a part of an overall system which allows the effective countering of the threat."

Reports from Vietnam attest to the dramatic success of the night-vision equipment now deployed there. The starlight scope and the crew-served weapons sight are being used extensively and effectively in various conditions of passive defense. In passive defense, the night observation device detects and identifies the exact target area to the rest of the defenders. Artillery and mortar fires are adjusted on these targets by using the night observation device to pinpoint our fire, thus avoiding needless destruction. The Navy uses night vision devices for coastline surveillance in patrolling rivers and harbors, and they have been used successfully in Southeast Asia in aircraft to detect and disperse enemy troops moving at night.

The smallest of the three devices is the individual weapons night vision sight, more commonly called the small starlight scope. This uses a 25-mm. tube and is passive; that is, it uses only the surrounding night sky light but no artificial illumination. The light is collected by the objective lens. The tube is behind the lens, and the image is viewed through a magnifying eyepiece. The battery and power supply are in the housing, and the complete system is self-contained. The viewer can be hand-held or mounted on a weapon.



The next larger device is the crew-served weapons sight which has the same type of image intensifier tube, power supply and battery as the small starlight scope. The largest in production is the medium-range night observation device. Its image tube is similar to the one in the two aforementioned devices, but it has a 40-mm. photocathode instead of the 25-mm. photocathode of the other systems. This device also has a much larger optical system. The night observation device is used to observe terrain and to detect objects of a tactical nature during darkness. It enables soldiers at outposts and listening posts and on patrol to detect, locate and identify enemy elements, and is also a general night-vision aid. This instrument can be mounted on a tripod.

From the Mekong Delta to the Demilitarized Zone, reports continue to flow back of combat successes directly

credited to the new family of night vision devices.


■ A U.S. infantry ambush patrol, using a small starlight scope, detected a company-sized Viet Cong force moving toward their position. As the Americans prepared to open fire, the patrol leader with the scope spotted a second company-sized VC force a short distance behind the first. He ordered his team to let the first unit pass through, and ambushed the second. In the confusion, the two VC groups fired on each other while the U.S. patrol withdrew and called in artillery fire support.

■ A gunship equipped with a starlight scope detected and identified a force of some 20 VC in a rice paddy at night. The VC were about to attack a nearby town as the gunship zeroed-in on them, firing several thousand rounds of 7.62-mm. ammunition. Next morning, forward air controllers confirmed heavy damage to the VC force, whose attack was spoiled.

■ A radar sweep of a strategic road in South Vietnam detected activity one night, and a crew-served weapon sight was employed to see what was going on. It showed a VC group in the act of mining a road. Artillery fire ended the operation and virtually wiped out the VC unit.

■ One night, a U.S. Army artillery aerial observer who was directing fire on targets of opportunity with a new night-vision device spotted a large 50-man motorized VC junk on the Saigon River. A 175-mm. gun zeroed-in on the junk and destroyed it with a first-round direct hit. A second junk was sighted with the scope and sunk a few minutes later.

These are a few of the many incidents where image intensification devices have been employed successfully by American forces to move back the cover of darkness which until recently had given the VC guerrilla a much better chance to survive in night fighting.



Powerful electronic light sources have not been neglected in the new night vision technology. The LS-59 electronic flasher, mounted in Mohawk aircraft, as in the drawing above, produces short, high-intensity flashes of light for night photographic missions. At upper right is the AN/VSS-3 Xenon searchlight, which uses visible or near infrared light, and is primarily intended for use on light armored vehicles. The wheel-mounted AN/TVS-3 searchlight, at right, is used to illuminate the battlefield for artillery fire. At half the weight of its 60-inch predecessor, this 30-inch light has twice the output.


The importance of night vision was pointed up last October by Gen. F. J. Chesarek, commanding general of Army Materiel Command and former assistant vice chief of staff of the Army. He told the sustaining members during AUSA's annual meeting at the Sheraton-Park Hotel in Washington, D.C., that in the 1970-80 time frame the Army will place major emphasis on night operations. He said it is one of eight trends that will dominate the professional landscape.

"Night operations," he declared, "will become much more extensive and meaningful as night vision devices continue to improve. This opens new spectrums of tactics, type and density of equipment, intelligence, target acquisition, and command and control. Equipment-wise, we must consider three aspects: needs of the individual soldier, combat surveillance, and target acquisition. Work in all areas is being pushed hard, with emphasis on the immediate needs of our forces in Vietnam. For a classic example of night operations, we can go back to Alexander the Great's victory in 326 B.C. at the Hydaspes River in India. What we are talking about today, however, is new in the sense of common, versus unique, doctrine. This field of endeavor holds as much promise for the Army as television did for communications media 20 years ago."

Night operations in the future will center on our improved technological ability to see in the dark and on the second-generation night-vision devices which will be much smaller, lighter, and have longer range, and will enhance that capability. The word "see" embraces both the higher capability for literal visual sight, as in the case of our new night-vision devices, and the elimination of the need for visual sight through weapons that can "see" or sense and pick-up targets without physical visual sighting. The first of the new second-generation night-vision devices is about a year away from production.

These goggle-style electronic binoculars permit night driving, and other close work in darkness, such as map reading and medical aid, at distances up to 50 feet.







Another revolutionary instrument that has helped our soldiers in Vietnam to find the enemy is the listening device. The director of Defense Research and Engineering, Dr. John S. Foster Jr., in his annual statement on R&D, said that listening devices the United States has placed on the battlefield to detect enemy infiltrators "will rank as one of the major technological contributions of the Vietnam War." He added that "we may well be on the verge" of keeping a battlefield under mechanical surveillance around the clock.

"Land combat may well have been revolutionized for the years ahead," Dr. Foster said, "by the emergence of a new family of sensors for remote detection and for rapid delivery of firepower. Building on our experience in Vietnam, the instrumented battlefield has become possible."

The research chief said anti-infiltration devices—including types which pick up vibrations in the ground as well as noises in the air—were used in the siege of Khe Sanh and in the defense of Saigon.

The system the Pentagon hopes to put into production calls for sensors that warn an automated command-and-control network of the approach of enemy troops. Then, artillery and bombs could be zeroed-in on the target or infantry and paratroopers could be alerted for dispatch to the area.

Dr. Foster also noted that, because of the success of the first-generation devices, many new night-vision systems are being introduced. These include low light-level television and forward-looking infrared systems for our combat aircraft fleet; night sights for use with our antitank missiles; night driving systems for the main battle tank 1970 (MBT-70) and other ground vehicles; and new night vision systems that will be field-tested during fiscal year 1970.

One hindrance to ground surveillance is that in most tactical situations the line of sight must depend on the terrain, thus restricting use of ground radar sets to ranges much below their capabilities. But this is no real problem to the Army, which clears the hurdle by using airborne surveillance and target acquisition equipment and systems, and by shooting photos, including infrared and radar pictures, from aircraft.

Although the earliest aerial photograph was taken in 1858 by a Frenchman using a camera attached to the basket of a balloon, the first military use of aerial photos came during the American Civil War. Two prints, each marked into 64 squares, created our first photomap. Since that time, the United States has used photo reconnaissance and photo interpretation during both world wars, the Korean war, and most recently the Vietnam war. Today in Vietnam, aerial photographs are revealing targets for South Vietnamese and American forces.

U.S. Army aerial surveillance is being carried out by OV-1A, OV-1B, and OV-1C Mohawk and other aircraft. The OV-1A is a visual-photo aircraft, the OV-1B has visual-photo-side-looking radar, and the OV-1C carries visual-photographic-infrared. Mohawks are authorized in the airmobile division, in aerial surveillance and target acquisition (ASTA) platoons and in aerial surveillance companies. These platoons and companies are assigned to corps and armies and attached to divisions and smaller units as the tactical situation dictates. Experience in Vietnam shows that the Mohawk's surveillance devices have responded to the ground commander's requirement for battlefield surveillance.

The new OV-1D (shown on the cover) will soon be in production. Compared to its predecessors, it has two additional access doors (on the left side of the fuselage and below the wing on each side of the present door) which considerably simplify installation, removal and servicing of sensor equipment. Easier access and the use of new side-loading equipment pallets permit the aircraft to be quickly converted in the field to either a stand-off, side-looking-radar or an infrared aircraft. This will permit a sensor interchange time of one hour. The multi-sensor capability gives the unit commander a considerably more flexible vehicle and enables him to quickly tailor the configuration of his assigned aircraft for highest capability under a wide variety of operational situations.

The multi-sensor capability also simplifies the task of installing new, specialized sensors as they become available. Sensors such as forward-looking infrared, night-vision devices and foliage penetration radars are always being investigated for special applications, and can be installed as they become available and as the mission dictates.

Besides the forward-looking KA-60 camera, a second KA-60 camera is added in a vertical position, thus giving a horizon-to-horizon capability for simultaneous forward oblique and vertical coverage. The current KA-30 camera is replaced by a new KA-76 which has three-, six-, and 12-inch lens cones and a 1¾-inch lens cone for wide-angle shots. Automatic exposure control will free the crew from the task of making in-flight exposure adjustments. An



Small, portable battlefield radars have reached a high stage of refinement in the Army's efforts to roll back the night. At left is the AN/PPS-5 set, which weighs 95 pounds and can be operated by one man. It can detect moving troops up to 5,000 meters, and vehicles at twice that range, giving both audible and visual readings. Twenty models of the ultralight AN/PPS-9, at right, have been ordered for evaluation. The entire unit weighs about 15 pounds.



LS-59A electronic flasher system provides night illumination.

The new OV-1D also has two additional wing store stations open on each wing (outboard of the existing stations) to accommodate a variety of pod-mounted equipment. The podded equipment can easily be installed or removed as the mission dictates.

Other new surveillance devices developed by AMC's Electronics Command at Fort Monmouth, N.J., that have joined the Army within the past year or so include a tactical imagery interpretation facility, AN/TSQ-43; ground surveillance portable radar, AN/PPS-5; photo processing darkroom, ES-38B; searchlight set, AN/TVS-3; Xenon searchlight, AN/VSS-3; electronic binoculars, AN/PAS-5; and electronic flasher, LS-59.

New equipment currently being developed that will eventually enhance our capability in Southeast Asia are omni-directional weapon-locating systems (including radar and acoustics); second-generation night-vision devices; airborne low light-level television; airborne forward-looking-infrared (FLIR); lightweight portable radar sets (AN/PPS-9 and AN/PPS-10); a new family of intrusion detectors; a laser target designation system; and a visual airborne target locator system (AN/UVS-1).

The Army is placing heavy emphasis on the visual airborne target locator system which is composed of airborne and ground elements. There are two main components: a stabilized telescope and an attitude reference system. The ground element consists mainly of a tracker with a distance measurer and a computer. The airborne elements were designed primarily for use in a UH-1 helicopter.

Another surveillance system that is being given "crash" treatment is the laser target designation system (LTDS) which consists of laser illuminators and airborne seekers. Still being developed, its automatic and manual seekers will be tested for the best operational configuration of the system.

Here are other devices the Army is still using in combat surveillance 24 hours a day in Vietnam:

- The infrared image metascope—a two-pound, hand-held, near-infrared viewing device with small accessory infrared light source—can detect enemy infrared light sources at ranges up to ten miles. With its own light source it can see for 15 meters and read maps and road signs. The viewing range may be extended when coupled to a high-intensity light source such as a searchlight.
- The AN/PPS-4 is a short-range, 115-pound radar that can detect moving troops up to 3,500 meters and moving vehicles up to 6,000. Moving targets can be heard on a headset.
- The AN/TPS-33, a medium-range radar, can detect moving troops up to 5,000 meters and moving vehicles up to 18,000. The targets are indicated by audio signals and video picture.
- The AN/TPS-25, a division-level radar set, is in the headquarters battery of division artillery. It can detect moving troops at 5,000 meters and moving vehicles at 18,000. It also furnishes audio and visual presentations of targets. Also, the deflection, range and elevation of the radar are linked electronically and mechanically to an indicator beneath the operator's mapboard, to show the area of the radar's coverage on a map or overlay. The indicator can be set to maps scaled at 1:25,000 or 1:50,000.
- The AN/MPQ-4, a direct-support artillery battalion radar, locates enemy weapons by detecting the trajectory of enemy mortar rounds and high-angle artillery projectiles whose smallest caliber is 60-mm. It has a 10-kilometer range and an accuracy of 50 meters in range by two mils in azimuth. A moving target information kit allows the radar to distinguish mortars from other targets, such as clouds and rain squalls.
- The AN/TSQ-43, a tactical image interpretation device, is self-contained and mounted in an expandable van. It extracts intelligence information from photographic, ra-

dar and infrared images. Several viewers are used for magnifying images and a computer for measuring. Results and observations are transmitted to the requesting commander by telephone, radio and teletypewriter.

■ The model MC-8 electronic microwave surveying instrument measures distances from 200 to 50,000 meters with a high degree of accuracy. Instead of a tellurometer cathode ray tube, it uses a numerical "readout" window which eliminates the job of interpreting images on the cathode ray tube. The window indicator also improves observation.

■ The Xenon searchlight, weighing only 238 pounds, is mounted on the M60 tank, and can use visible or infrared light. It can switch instantly from one to the other, to a narrow high intensity beam or to a wider diffused beam in either light mode. Its candlepower ranges into the millions.

■ The infrared weapons sight is used for locating and aiming at night targets. It can be used on or off the weapon, with its own infrared light or with a separate light source. It weighs 11 pounds, has a viewing range of 300 meters and 4½-power magnification.

■ The helmet-mounted near-infrared binocular is a two-pound, 50-meter range device that allows night driving at normal speeds when used with infrared filtered vehicle headlamps. It also may be used for limited observation.

■ The 30-inch general-purpose searchlight replaces the 60-inch model and has half the weight—1,200 pounds—and twice the light output. It has 400 million candlepower and a 10,000-meter range for indirect use. It can illuminate the battlefield by direct light on the target; by indirect, diffused scattered light from an overhead beam; or by reflection from cloud cover.

All these combat surveillance devices are designed for one thing: to find the enemy. They can do it, but it takes the tough, intelligent soldier to use them well. One of the most dependable and reliable ways to find the enemy is by good old visual observation: the soldier's eyes. Some Army units especially tailored for reconnaissance and surveillance missions use little more than eyeball observation. A ranger company (previously termed "long-range reconnaissance patrol company," and called LURP by its members), which has become so popular in Vietnam, is authorized for each corps and field army. The mission of its three patrol platoons is battlefield reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition throughout the corps or army area. The basic working element of the company is the six-man patrol which can be positioned behind enemy lines. The patrol members use binoculars and the new starlight scope to extend their surveillance.

The Army has found that nuclear weapons and guerrilla warfare during conventional combat action demand broader dispersion and accelerated tactical mobility.

In Vietnam, for example, the classical continuous front behind which all is under control is unknown. Units are disposed in checkerboard fashion with wide gaps between combat elements. Tactical units operate over extended distances during fluid battle and must be constantly ready for all-around combat. Remember what Napoleon said? "We must separate to live, but concentrate to fight."

The creation of many widely dispersed and isolated strongpoints instead of fewer heavy concentrations and a continuous front make our forces in Vietnam less vulnerable to guerrilla attack but still in need of excellent around-the-clock combat surveillance, target acquisition, reconnaissance and night vision.

Modern warfare continues to dictate the need for many new means of reconnaissance and surveillance. The many new, highly developed devices and scientific methods that point to progress in this direction offer a sparkling and dynamic future for the U.S. Army's overall combat surveillance.

▲

End Run!

The colonel who commanded our Pentagon unit was well-known for his tendency to judge his staff's paperwork by quantity rather than quality. Most of us just went along with his wishes until one enterprising staffer found a way to beat the system.

This subordinate had submitted a speech to the colonel for approval. It came back moments later with a terse note that the speech was too short. Knowing that the colonel couldn't have read the speech in such a short time, he had it retyped with narrower margins and triple-spaced instead of doubled-spaced. The result was the same number of words but five pages longer.

The rest of us saw the light when the colonel delightedly approved the second effort and commended the staffer for his fine work.

MAJ. JOHN R. FISKE

▲

No Chance of Surprise

Years ago at Fort Sill, during a battery test, an umpire approached a lonely sentry stationed on the unit's flank.

"Soldier, what are you doing out here?"

The sentry jumped to attention. "Sir, I am the air-ground warning sentry."


The umpire said, "Very well. What's the warning signal for an air attack?"

The soldier knowingly smiled and quickly replied, "Sir, the signal for an air attack is three shots in the air."

The umpire replied, "Very good. How about a ground attack?"


A puzzled look came over the soldier's face. A pause followed, and then, "Sir, the signal for a ground attack is three shots in the ground!"

LT. COL. EDWIN B. JUNGE
U. S. Army, retired



We can design and produce a complete system.

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
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What Are Generals Made Of?—II

Character Is The Arbiter

By Maj. Gen. A. S. Newman

There is paradox along the pathway to the stars: Boldness, imagination, vitality—the hallmarks of the combat leader—can themselves become the roots of failure. The fire must be tempered by ice—human understanding, judgment, and a sense of perspective.

In "What Are Generals Made Of?", in the July issue, Gen. Newsman examined the highlights of some general officers' careers from cadet days to field grade rank. The article that follows, the last of a two-part series, looks at some generals while they were generals.—THE EDITORS.

It's clear there is no formula, based on measurable qualities, that leads to star rank, but there are patterns in what people do and how they react to situations.

In my first year as a cadet, our brilliant young superintendent, Brig. Gen. Douglas MacArthur, was already a living legend. On the infrequent occasions we saw him, the rainbow of ribbons on his chest reflected his gallant World War I battle record and, somehow, emphasized the great void between us. It seemed impossible that this gap in years and distinction could be bridged by any kind of personal touch.

When news circulated that our "Supe" would bring a bride to the historic red-brick house facing the parade ground, it all seemed remote and impersonal to us. Then each cadet received an individually packaged piece of the general's wedding cake.

Some will say this personal touch of a piece of wedding cake to every cadet was an isolated incident, unrelated to Gen. MacArthur's military career. They are wrong on both counts, for I saw him apply the same principle—reaching out for contact with those under him—at a critical time during World War II in the Southwest Pacific. (That's another and longer story.)

In the early 1930s the Hawaiian Division was commanded by one of the Army's great combat soldiers, Maj. Gen. Halstead Dorey (Distinguished Service Cross, Distinguished Service Medal, four awards of the Silver Star and four of the Purple Heart). On a certain payday night—always a busy time for the division's military police—my friend and fellow lieutenant, Paul MacLaughlin, was the MP duty officer.

One of the "customers" brought to MP headquarters was a soldier in an exhilarated condition. While waiting his turn for Paul to handle his case, the soldier was parked on the "mourners' bench," a heavy, pew-like seat with side arms at both ends. But he would not stay put, making a loud nuisance of himself, including barging into Paul's office a couple of times.

Finally, Paul decided the soldier's obnoxious behavior was a put-on to harass the MPs. So he ordered the man's wrist handcuffed to an arm of the mourners' bench, thus anchoring him in place. Within minutes, Gen. Dorey walked in the door of MP headquarters.

Everybody snapped to rigid attention—except the culprit cuffed to the arm of the mourners' bench—and a tense silence settled as the distinguished old general stopped in the hallway, leaning on a gold-headed cane. Lt. MacLaughlin came out of his office and halted at attention. From the vantage point of nearly 40 years of service, the grizzled, war-crippled old soldier looked around him, his tired battlewise eyes taking in the situation.

The now suddenly unexhilarated soldier, anchored to the oak arm by his steel cuff, was the first to break the tableau.

"General," he said in a piteously meek voice, lifting his hand to rattle the handcuff against the oak bench arm, "I don't deserve this!"

After looking at the soldier a moment, then glancing around at the desk sergeant and the motionless MPs, Gen. Dorey turned to Paul and said, "Lieutenant, I don't know what happened here before I came in. You must keep in mind, however, that if a man is unnecessarily and unjustly manacled, the iron on his arm may enter his heart."

When the general turned and walked out as quietly as he had entered, Paul looked at the mourners' bench and said, "It didn't work, did it?"

The rumpled soldier lifted his shoulders in a little philosophical shrug. "Well, Lieutenant, it was worth a try."

Gen. Dorey had the perception to see the obvious

difference between the rowdy payday celebrant and the neatly uniformed MPs; also, the human understanding to visualize what happened before he arrived, and to see through the act put on for his benefit. Further, he had the wisdom to avoid a cheap display of indignation over a handcuffed soldier without knowing the facts, which would have damaged the standing of a fine young officer and thus impaired the discipline of a key element of his command. On the other hand, he made it clear to all present that he viewed use of forcible restraint as a very serious matter.

In World War II, my division—in Australia to train for a major operation in New Guinea and camped in the intermittently wooded countryside—received word of a coming visit by our Sixth Army commander, Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger. The grapevine also circulated a broader supplementary warning: Gen. Krueger was a real tough cookie, and he specialized in checking unit messes.

When Gen. Krueger arrived, he more than lived up to advance billing; hard-eyed and grim, he wasted few words. In one of the early companies he visited he headed straight for the mess before the first lieutenant in command could report.

When the company commander arrived on the double, the general and his party were near the kitchen garbage pit. The general pointed at several fragments of food scattered on the ground and asked, "Lieutenant, what's your explanation for that?"

"Sir," the young officer replied, "we didn't expect you for another half hour."

There was a stunned silence at this, the most classic wrong answer of which I have any knowledge, especially when given to Gen. Krueger. But the general's comment is a classic, too.

"Lieutenant," he said, "you don't run this mess for me. You run it for the men in your company."

Gen. Krueger did not develop his feeling of responsibility for the well-being of those under him after he pinned on stars. Rather, it is one of the primary qualities which made him a general, and a major factor in his outstanding success in that grade.



In a high headquarters where I served after the war, we got a new four-star commander with a great national name. One day, his chief of staff sat in on a scheduled ten-minute briefing for the CG by a lieutenant colonel. There were carefully prepared charts, and the briefing officer was extremely well informed on his subject.

"That's all," the general finally interrupted, "your ten minutes are up."

"Sir," the briefing officer said in some agitation, "I've not yet covered the main issue on which a decision is needed."

"I know," the general said, "but your ten minutes are up." And he reached for the paper he had been studying when the briefing started.

This left it for the chief of staff to take over. In his office the chief explained to the crestfallen briefing officer



that the general's time was valuable, that he could never accomplish his diverse responsibilities unless he budgeted his time. The chief also said that, hereafter, the briefer should be less concerned with displaying his own broad knowledge of the subject and proceed directly to the pertinent facts and factors necessary for a decision.

That general knew the story would circulate through his headquarters over cups of coffee, thus broadcasting the idea he would not tolerate verbosity that wasted his time. This matter of time becomes a growing problem the higher you go, not only because duties are more complex but also because so many more people are pressing to take up your limited time unnecessarily.

Any officer who fails to control and organize his time is unlikely to wear stars. That is why the generals you meet always seem time-conscious. It is also why many of them appear abrupt and unapproachable.

Some star comments are:

■ It is universally agreed that every man in ranks is a human being, yet there is a vocal element who would have you believe most *generals* are not. But that is untrue, as I think these footnotes to the past indicate. Further, like everybody else, they are afflicted with all the frailties of human nature.

■ To offset these frailties, those who rise to star rank need other strong qualities, which may explain why some are considered curious people—or, anyway, complex personalities. There is, however, one overriding quality they must have, which these incidents reveal and which a study at West Point years ago listed as an essential quality for leadership: human understanding.

■ Shakespeare said, "The evil that men do lives after them; the good is oft interred with their bones." The hard side of generals, along with their frailties as viewed after the fact by second-guessing writers, receive wide publicity. But their human side often lies buried in unnoticed silence.

Any analysis of what generals are made of would be incomplete without a closer look at some freewheeling attributes, as well as a glimpse of clay feet. Not long after receiving my first star, I attended a small cocktail hour for eight or ten generals. When the conversation turned to outstanding officers in line for promotion to star status, the name of one colonel was mentioned as a sure bet for selection.

"No," a brigadier said, "Col. Soandso will never make it. He's got a court-martial on his record."

The senior officer present, a three-star army commander, turned around to remark, "Oh, I wouldn't say that, because I've got a court on my record, too!"

That general was no once-in-a-lifetime case, for I've heard of two other generals with courts-martial in their

files, and a four-star general whose record included a reprimand. Their disciplinary misadventures certainly were no help; in fact, those officers had to be particularly outstanding to overcome black marks against them from their salad days. I think, however, that the same obstreperous qualities that got them into hot water as young officers were, when brought under control, a factor in their eventual selection for stars.

Since the majority of colonels eligible for selection are qualified to become general officers, we come back again to that basic question: What characteristics lift the "best qualified" above many other outstanding professional soldiers? Recently I learned of a little happening which is revealing. I knew the two general officers concerned, and this happening highlights intangible facets of their characters worth noting.

The occasion was the birthday of a division commander. His headquarters officers decided to give him a surprise party, so, to set the stage, his chief of staff invited the CG and his lady for informal end-of-day cocktails—with no reference to birthdays. Thus, it was after dark when the colonel was told everything was ready.

"General," the colonel said, "that call reported a riot in progress down at the rock quarry swimming pool!"

The general promptly grabbed his hat and took off with the colonel for the scene of the riot. On arrival at the incline leading down to the pool, which was a water-filled old quarry fitted out with a swimming float and other pool equipment, the general jumped from the car. His chief then turned off the car lights.

"Turn on the damned lights! I can't see a thing!" the general shouted.

Whereupon the whole pool area was suddenly flooded with lights, as officers of his headquarters and their ladies sang "Happy birthday!"



This was the kickoff to a fine picnic-type party. Among others present was the assistant division commander, still in a body cast because he had a fractured vertebra. This injury resulted from a parachute jump, when a gusty wind had blown him out of the drop zone to land in a ditch.

Now, as the surprise party drew to its close, the division commander produced a surprise of his own. He rose to his feet and announced, "In the airborne, everybody follows their leader!"

He then climbed up the "high dive" tower and plunged down into the pool—clothes and all. Naturally, the officers, including some who had never before ventured to make the high dive, followed their leader and splashed down amid much laughter, punctuated by appropriate squeals from wives as their husbands took off.

Suddenly, the division surgeon shouted, "Don't let him jump—he'll kill himself—he can't swim in that cast!"

His shout came too late, for the awkward figure of the assistant division commander, sheathed in the rigid body cast, crashed down into the pool from the high dive. When they fished him out, grinning and sputtering but without further damage, that buttoned up the party.

Many inferences can be drawn about what intangible qualities in the two generals were revealed by that splashing finale. They faced quite different challenges, yet each, in his way, turned circumstances to his advantage and came away one-up. Some may cluck about senior officers in such an off-trail maneuver, but both of those generals were successful combat commanders, and battle leaders don't come in pantywaist models.

In the mid-1950s, while in Germany, I went to a social function for American officers working on documenting the history of World War II. Also present were senior generals of the old Wehrmacht. I was impressed with those German generals I met, who were not Nazi or SS types but regular army professionals.

One of them was a rather small, bald man who seemed to take himself seriously. Since he was standing quietly alone, I moved over to talk with him. On getting close enough to read his name tag I discovered he was Col. Gen. Kurt Zeitzler, chief of the Army General Staff under Hitler, 1942-44.

After a little mutual back-scratching about professional military leadership on both sides, I asked, "How did you pick generals in the old professional Wehrmacht?"

"Character!" he said without a moment's hesitation, holding up a finger to emphasize his point, and repeating, "Character—without that, you have nothing!"

He then went on to make clear that intangible qualities were what they looked for as the foundation on which to build military leadership. We may not think of it that way, but these same intangibles are reflected in our efficiency reports, too—especially in written evaluations under "Remarks." An officer is not rated in a vacuum solely on his drillfield performance, but on what kind of man he is: his character. Make no mistake; when you see years of efficiency reports on an officer, by many raters, the outlines come clear: as a strong character, as a weak character, or a middle-of-the-road good officer.

One of the most penetrating descriptions of a man I've ever read was, "he did his best in everything." This was in a biography of General of the Armies John J. Pershing, said about the young Pershing by one of his contemporaries. He didn't get the name "Black Jack" for nothing, either, which reflects another facet of his character.

Sometimes one of the primary characteristics which pushed a man to general officer status may get him in trouble—which was the case with Brig. Gen. Francis T. Dodd. I knew him as a cadet and admired him greatly, for he impressed me then as a future general. A fine-looking forceful personality, self-confident and much respected. It was his very boldness and positive character that, in an unwary moment, resulted in his being seized by North Korean POWs in Korea, leading to his reduction to the grade of colonel.

Granted, Frank Dodd got beaned by an unexpected fast inside pitch while crowding the plate, but it seems to me he has more than paid for that. Now, nearly 20 years later, his name is on the retired list as a colonel. I respectfully suggest that it would be in the best interest of the military service and our country if a senator from Texas—where Frank lives now—initiated a bill to restore Francis Townsend Dodd to the rank of brigadier general on the retired list. But for that one momentary lapse, resulting from his

own fearlessness, I think he would have reached multi-star rank.



This emphasizes another intangible aspect of general officer status: that strong driving personality characteristics lift an officer to star level, and are vital to his success in that grade. Yet those same qualities often bring down criticism on his head. There are endless incidents to verify this contradictory situation, perhaps the most overt and publicized being that of the "Patton soldier-slapping incident." The explosive nature of that great battle captain, which made the regrettable incident possible, also a vital element in making Gen. Patton one of the only two American generals in the last 100 years who can be classed as a true military genius.

At best, we've been able to make only spot checks into this complex and evanescent subject of who gets to be generals, and why. Every officer of experience has his memory library of things he has seen general officers do, before and after they pinned on stars, especially how they reacted to various situations. Thus, each experienced reader can conduct his own analysis, using his personally assembled empirical factors.

Of course, I'm out on a limb by writing about such an explosively controversial subject, to which there can never be any one approved answer. It is not the first time, however, that I have stuck my neck out and, I hope, not the last. My final comments are:

■ Chance circumstances often play a decisive part in raising any one officer to star rank—as well as blocking the road for others. Almost always, the real comers, those who have everything, overcome bad breaks and forge their own opportunities. This opens a whole new field of case histories, many of them difficult to describe. For those who feel abused by fate it is well to remember that some of our greatest soldiers reached the top because they stayed in there pitching in the face of adversity. Fate has a way of evening things up in the long run.

■ No one has a better chance to evaluate your ability than the man you work for, and he's the one who writes your efficiency report. Further, those with the best opportunities to evaluate an officer's overall career are those who see all his efficiency reports and the papers related to them. Finally, those who can best evaluate all colonels in the zone of consideration—in relation to each other—are experienced older officers of balanced judgment who see all of their efficiency reports. That's what the board of generals do who, by law, select colonels for nomination to the Senate for promotion.

■ This system means that those nominated for general officer rank are the colonels who, in the consensus of those in the best position to know, are best qualified to wear stars. We have so many superbly qualified colonels that it is very hard to choose among them. I know, because I was a member of such a board of ten major generals, chaired by a lieutenant general. It is not a matter of adding up overall efficiency index scores. You try to see the man, not just pieces of paper. In my view, it's the colonels who have the right kind of strong intangibles whose ability, character and leadership qualities give them the edge.

■ This is the system used in peacetime for selecting up to two-star generals. Selections for three and four stars are quite different in nature, and I am not sure I understand all I know about that, except that there's a political angle—but this analysis has already complicated itself enough. Besides, it is a good idea when pontificating to stick to things about which you have personal knowledge, and I was never tapped for enrollment in the multi-star fraternity.

■ There are many kinds of generals—peacetime generals, wartime generals, staff generals and command generals, technical services generals and other highly specialized generals—even space age generals. Each type has its own demanding requirements which differ from others, but the same basic character qualities are common to them all. The best summary known to me is the poem by Rudyard Kipling, titled "If—." I would like to add, however—in the light of my story in the July issue about two brigadiers and the old British sergeant major—that Kipling forgot to include the idea about the sergeant major's son. In my opinion, it is an intangible not to be overlooked—but don't overdo it. If you're too nice to be true, everybody may love you, but you'll probably never be a general.

■ For those officers who aspire to stars, I congratulate you on setting yourself that goal; work toward it, but don't bet your happiness you'll get there. The road has too many unpredictable twists and turns. Yet nobody ever climbed the mountain who didn't try. Make yourself a 30-year drill schedule of duty assignments that best fits in with your planned route to professional advancement, but keep it flexible. Study successful leaders under whom you serve, and learn from them. Also read biographies of great soldiers, but not merely about their battles and achievements; look for the intangibles which were the foundation of their success. Finally, remember that to emulate great leaders, past or present, does not mean to copy or ape them. Study yourself, too, so that you put on only those shoes—and characteristics—which fit you.

Everything considered, what are generals made of? They're made of some qualities they were born with, but, in large measure, their success depends on what kind of personal and professional characters they develop for themselves—and a smile from Lady Luck.

▲

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
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in tune with the times

By Col. S. Q. Lapias

At Leavenworth in 1946, the instructors were already referring to World War II as "the last war" in the context of "let's try to think ahead to the next one."

As a very junior captain, I was strangely impressed. Also somewhat bewildered, and just a little bit hurt. After all, World War II was *the* war, and how did these guys know that the next fight would be any different?

Since then, I have been reminded time and again that the U.S. Army does think ahead. The planners aren't always right—the crystal ball does get clouded at times—but we do have some brilliantly successful forward thinking.

But while the Army isn't transfixed by the lessons of "the last war," it does doggedly persist in maintaining some obsolete trappings of the past.

There are, of course, all kinds of diehards around—few of them, fortunately, among the men who plan Army materiel and tactics.

What bothers me here are the diehards who are sticking grimly with a concept of military sociology which is just flat out of tune with the time we live in.

There is a lot of talk nowadays about a "volunteer army." Whether it is a good idea or not, I won't argue, although the volunteer concept would make economic sense if it can halt the incessant turnover in trained men.

The point is, if the President of the United States says he wants a volunteer army, we will get a volunteer army.

But the presidential will is going to be subverted if a large group of "Old Army" diehards stick to the pay incentive as the main inducement, and summarily reject some changes in military sociology which might significantly improve recruitment and retention.

Right now we would do well to have a thorough, intensive review of the sociological system which is the U.S. Army, but I don't see it on the R&D books.

Roger W. Little, who teaches sociology at the University of Illinois, is a former Army officer who knows soldiers and soldiering. He did a bang-up job in Korea. He sounded off at the recent Colloquium on the American Military Profession at Pennsylvania Military College (ARMY, April 1969), and created a little furore by suggesting that saluting is an anachronism, and that Saturday morning inspection is a massive invasion of privacy.


I can see the hair rising on the collective necks of the "Old Army," from the new OCS lieutenants to the multi-starred generals. But why not listen to Professor Little and hear what he has to say?

Regardless of what happens to the volunteer army, think for a moment about the army we have today: It is hard to get first-termers to re-enlist; it is hard to hold the highly skilled men that we need most; it is hard to maintain "discipline" in its classical manifestations.

And it is hard to suppress the outward signs of psychological revolt against the "system" and the "establishment." It is going to get harder. If the U.S. Army does not alter some of its hoary traditions, it is going to have to face up to some of the more drastic forms of social unrest plaguing the civilian community.

There are a lot of things about the contemporary army which bug the hell out of the men who make up its ranks today, but who might be the leaders of the army 10 to 20 years hence. Take, for example, haircuts. We make a real big fuss over haircuts, but what do we gain by it?

COL. S. Q. LAPIAS is the pseudonym of an occasional contributor to ARMY who, in his 25 years of service, has had more than 10 years in command slots. Although he is a technical services officer, he has seen enough combat to earn two awards of the Purple Heart and two of the Silver Star. He is now in the Republic of Vietnam.



Just how immutable are some of the monastic "traditions" we impose on the troops? Some changes in military sociology might make life in the Army more believable to a new generation of soldiers.

More important, what does it cost us in the long run?

The Army regulation is plain enough: "The hair will be well-groomed, cut short or medium length and neatly trimmed at all times." This would appear to leave some leeway for personal expression on tonsorial preference, and the soldier is more than duly grateful for the opportunity to be himself.

But let him try it! What happens now? Let a soldier sprout low sideburns (albeit of short or medium length hair) and the howls of protest from his superiors would convince one that the Army holds Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside's haircut responsible for his shortcomings at Antietam and Fredericksburg. One of the commanders in my area has published a ludicrously detailed "interpretation" of the reg: "Sideburns will reach no lower than the line from the lateral palpebral commissure of the eye to the tragus of the ear." (Ask your sergeant major to borrow Gray's *Anatomy* from the battalion doc, and ask the doc over for an "interpretation," and you find that this permits the sideburns to be cut on the bias, which, of course, will be later forbidden by an amendment.) The IG jumps other commanders who fail to follow suit in similarly tightening the DA mandate. The chief of staff of the Army is disturbed over haircuts when he visits the theater. Now the sergeant major of the Army is in the act with a letter deploring "misunderstanding" over "interpretation" of the regulation and failure to comply with "established standards" of appearance.


Somebody in DA apparently wanted to give the soldier some freedom when he drafted paragraph 31 of AR 600-20 and "established" a "standard"—a loose standard. Yet the Army establishment at large—from the chief of staff down to the platoon sergeant—doesn't want to go along with it.

The contemporary soldier values his hair, and I would like to go along with him. My own haircut will match Gen. Westmoreland's, in both cut and color, but I am not trying to impose it on my troops. Recently I swore into the Army for six years a first-term RA soldier in a critical technical MOS. His sideburns came down as low as his ear lobes; the hair on the back of his neck touched his collar when he threw his shoulders back proudly and raised his hand to "repeat after me;" the hair on top rose and fell in a full head of waves. The sergeant major of the Army would have been appalled. But the soldier had no ducktail—just a low hairline in the rear. The sideburns were neatly trimmed; long, but "abnormally" long? Not in my estimation. The hair on top was cut medium length. The whole mop was neat. The fact that he probably spent more time that morning brushing his hair than brushing his shoes bothered me not at all.

I doubt if this man would have reenlisted if, in his two years of service in my command, he had been forced to wear a crew cut with white sidewalls. He had two years of college, and the Army needed him in a critical technical MOS. But he was a product of contemporary American society, and that's the way young Americans wear their hair nowadays.

Why not? What, if anything, is the military value of a shaved head? It might have cut down the louse population in World War I or the Civil War, but this problem is long past in our Army. Has anybody ever equated combat proficiency with length of hair? Not to my knowledge. On the face of it, you can rule out the correlation. If long hair means poor soldiers, then scratch the value of the 11 divisions of the Bundeswehr, and discount the combat potential of the Soviet noncom. How long has a short haircut been a traditional "standard" in the United States Army? For two generations at most. It sat all right with these generations. But now a new generation has come along.

Beards are out by reg, and no quarrel. DA guidance needs no further "interpretation." But how much time are



we wasting debating whether or not a mustache is "neatly trimmed?" Some interpret this to mean "small" or "short," but you *can* have a *neat* handlebar, a *neat* Fu Manchu, a *neat* Zapata. Again, why not? Incidentally, someone *has* studied (in the British Royal Navy) the correlation between mustaches and military proficiency. Mustache versus no mustache showed no difference. Most styles of mustache were entirely neutral. A few styles were correlated with higher proficiency. Only one style was correlated with lowered performance, but it was a style which I have not encountered in the present-day army. So forget mustaches. Let the kids grow them if they wish.

We are knocking ourselves out imposing monastic procedural restrictions on members of a profession whose "unlimited liability clause" to serve and die in combat is alone quite sufficient evidence of dedication to the order.

Take the barracks, for example. There is good military reason for each soldier having a footlocker, a duffel bag, and a specified set of clothing. He may have to move out, fast. There is good reason for a periodic layout according to strict form: it permits the inspector to check quickly for defects. We provide the soldier with a minimum of furniture—a bunk and a locker. But this is a minimum only. Beyond this, why do most of us insist that the soldier's home must look like a cell? One "enlightened" commander I know of came into some money and decided to "fix up" the billets. He had his NCO council determine what kind of furniture the men should have, and he bought for each man a new bed, a chair, a desk, a lamp, draperies for the window, and a picture for the wall. No more, no less, and all alike. The men would have been happier had they been encouraged to turn loose on their own funds. One man buys a foam rubber mattress. Another puts in a console hi-fi. One plasters psychedelic posters on the wall. One puts up Polaroid three-dimensional lighted landscapes, one collects clocks, another hangs mobiles. Of course, there are pin-ups. If they sell *Playboy* in the PX, why can't the soldier hang the foldouts? There is no good reason why not, and there is a good reason why.

If we want a modern army, then we must admit right away that the barracks is an anachronism. The barracks is out. The dormitory is in. Every soldier deserves a private room, albeit a small one. He deserves a room where he can sleep undisturbed in the day time when he is on night duty. He deserves a room which he can lock to protect his valuables.

Once we give the soldier a place to live in some privacy, then we need to amend the "house rules" of the dormitory to permit him to live like an adult. Bed check is childish, and the soldier earnestly resents it. Bed check may work in a TOE outfit whose garrison mission is pure training, but it doesn't work worth a damn in that large part of the United States Army which is operating day in and day out with two or three shifts a day. Bed check may cut down on bistro brawls, but I doubt it. I think the way to keep the troops out of trouble in geisha houses and gasthauses is to keep them on post—by supplying on post what it is they want. This means good clubs: booming, swinging, jumping and wide open to local girls, whoever they are, without prior moral judgment. If you insist on sedate, coat-and-tie establishments on post, and insist on midnight bed check, then the men just go off post sooner, drink faster and get into competitive brawls over the pick-ups between 2200 and 2345.

Another thing that bugs the men is the overseas liquor ration. Why can a married Sp.5 or a single Sp.6 buy good American liquor tax-free, while the barracks Sp.4 has to spend his meager pay for local hooch of dubious quality? In 25 years of military service I have seen utterly no indication that a first sergeant, a lieutenant, or even a colonel can hold his liquor any better than a private. Those ranks hold it from public view by drinking in quarters, and the private ought to have access to *his* bottle in *his* billets. The military cure for abuse of alcohol is to stop coddling drunks of any grade. Whenever they show up for duty tight or hung-over, lower the boom. Get them out of the service, if they keep it up, instead of transferring them, as is the custom. And quit excusing some soldier's belligerent or destructive behavior on his claim, "I couldn't help it; I was drunk." Make him pay for breach of peace or property financially and judicially. Such a policy has an immediate salutary effect when firmly and openly introduced, and I have seen the drunken brawl rate cut by four-fifths within two weeks of change of commanders in a battalion.

Once we give the soldier a little freedom to be himself, and to lead his own private life, then we need to consider his career. What has he got to look forward to over the long haul?

Not enough in the way of advancement.

Under cover of a variety of excuses and rationalizations we have inflated the grade structure of the Army in an attempt to raise the pay of the younger soldier. Either we need two or three more grades, or we need a complete overhaul of the grade-pay structure, or both. Almost every reasonably bright soldier nowadays (and bright soldiers are what we need in a modern army) makes E-5 on his first enlistment. The fifth grade up from the bottom used to be staff sergeant, and it was an honorable rank to reach and retire on. Now it is simply the dividing line between the curious enlistee (or reluctant draftee) on one side, and the career soldier on the other. Regardless of our pronouncements on boosting NCO prestige, the "supergrades" —E-8 and E-9—were created to hike the pay of soldiers

stymied at what used to be the top. But the top two grades never will be, nor should be, open to all; most officers can expect to make colonel, but not all colonels will make general. The net result of inflation to E-5 and limitation of entry into the supergrades is that the average first-term RA enlistee can look forward with reasonable certainty to only two promotions over the next 17 years of service. Any industrial concern with so restrictive an advancement policy would be frozen out of the recruiting market, and the same thing is happening to the Army.


Unless we can show the first-term enlistee a career ladder with some sort of attainable, tangible, and meaningful promotion every three years or so, we are not going to get many of the ambitious ones. One promotion every three years for the next 15 years is five grades after E-5, and on top of that there must be a couple of "supergrades" for the real outstanding ones. So we wind up with a 12-grade enlisted structure. Ridiculous? Perhaps not.

One way would be to deflate the lower grades again. Restrict advancement in the first enlistment to E-3, pay the E-3 enough to support his wife, and require the man who earns that grade to really be a first-class private. Give the recruit a solid wage, and give the private a solid advance in pay scale when he starts functioning as a working soldier. Five grades after E-3 would bring us to E-8, and two supergrades to E-10. If 10 is simply unacceptable as too many, then drop back to 9 or even 8, and make every man who passes that magic mark a warrant officer.

Here we hear the muffled gasp of some oldtimer. "You just don't make enlisted men into officers, even warrant officers. After all, there is a difference, you know." Is there?

So what if this soldier didn't go to college and didn't stem from "middle-class" society? So what if he has not been through the initiation rites of OCS? So what if he served time on the juvenile detention farm for breaking and entering a liquor store at age 15? He has soldiered well for 17 years. He has acquired the experience and maturity to hold the post of command sergeant major. Why isn't he fit to switch over from the NCO clubs to the officers' open mess? Don't tell me that his wife won't fit in with the group. You haven't been in close enough contact with these men and their wives. My command recently acquired a new warrant officer—a direct appointment from grade E-6, with 13 years of service. He was immediately accepted into the Thursday Night Privy Poker Group (colonels, light colonels, one major, the chaplain, and the warrant) because he is good company and a good poker player. His wife is one of the gracious guiding queens of the officers' wives club.

My closest personal friend in this area is a master sergeant in a nearby outfit. We play cards together. Our wives grew up together; both were daughters of pre-World War II sergeants at Benning. They are both equally ladies, and he, himself, could easily step into field-grade shoes or a chief warrant officer's suit.



Like it or not, we had better admit that we have a caste system in the United States Army, and that it has outlived its usefulness. Why should we have two separate career structures—officer and enlisted? Yes, we need officers, and we need enlisted men. But must they always remain separate? Why must all lieutenants be pink-cheeked, and all master sergeants grizzled? Who is better qualified to command a company—a first sergeant who has distinguished himself in a job he learned by 15 years of experience—or a first lieutenant who learned his profession in four years of college and two years of applied practice?

We need to develop a number of points of lateral transfer between the enlisted and the officer ladder, which implies a number of "entry points" into the officer structure. We are familiar with the entry point of second lieutenant for new graduates of officer training. We are beginning to get used to entry of medical officers as captains. Why not an entry at major for a CW-4 who has proved executive ability beyond mere technical competence, and an entry into CW-2 for the outstanding noncom?

So we fix up the advancement problem. What else does the soldier have to look forward to during the next 17 or 27 years? Not enough in the way of education.

A couple of months back I caught hell from my general two months running for failing to re-enlist a single first-term RA soldier. I had cards in my pocket on every eligible man. I knew each one. I talked to every one of them. I couldn't put my heart in my pitch. Of the dozen, one was worthless; had he wanted to stay RA I would have put a bar on his reenlistment. The other 11 were all high school graduates, and every one of them intended to go back to civil life in order to go to college.

The quest for a higher education is now a firm characteristic of American life. The diploma on the wall has deep symbolic value, of and for itself, not valued by the added income it supposedly will bring. If we could offer these men a real good chance to get a college degree over the next 12 to 15 years, a lot of them would stay.

"Aha!," you say. "But they do have this opportunity. There is U.S. Armed Forces Institute, and community colleges, and overseas branches of the University of Maryland. A lot of officers and enlisted men get college degrees while on active duty."

A fair number of officers, yes, but not too many enlisted men. The enlisted man needs more than ambition. He needs a lot of backing, and he needs a lot of luck. He needs backing, because he does not generally have the freedom of action of the officer, who can usually more readily adjust his working hours to fit the school hours so

long as he gets his military job done. The enlisted man is more likely to be tied to an eight-to-five (or six-to-six) schedule.

And the enlisted man needs luck. If he is stationed in Washington, or Omaha, or Fort Bliss, he has no difficulty in finding a college to go to in spare time. If he is stationed at Fort Polk or Fort Leonard Wood, he has a real problem. Overseas, if he is stationed in Munich or Tokyo, he can take college courses readily—and he does in droves. If he is stationed at Grafenwöhr or Camp Casey, opportunities are severely limited.

Almost anywhere in the Army it is true that a man can take some sort of college credit courses. But the academic fare is sparse: criminology I, business English, elementary Italian. He is in a bind when he needs Russian II, organic chemistry, or calculus in order to finish the two years of credit he needs to be eligible for the Bootstrap program.

Some start is being made. The Navy is cranking a master's degree right into the flight training of (selected) aviation cadets at Pensacola. The Army is getting a master's program started at Leavenworth. The University of Oklahoma has a good thing going with its five-day cram courses followed by extensive off-duty reading, leading to a degree of master of arts in public administration. But these are graduate courses, or nice arrangements for officers. How about the Sp.4 who would like to get a bachelor's degree before his son does?

There is enough talent, equipment, and facilities on any brigade-sized post to run the first two years of college. The cost of equipping a maintenance shop to function at night as a physics laboratory, or a dispensary to function as a biology or chemistry laboratory would be negligible, and much of it could be done with federal stock number equipment and supplies. Crank in courses in European history, Oriental culture, applied geology, and comparative politics at the overseas posts, and then give a little college credit for some of the military arts and sciences, and we can bring the Bootstrap program within reach of every soldier with the ambition for it.

Besides pay, promotion, education, and freedom for personal expression, don't forget the little gimmicks. The first flicker of interest I felt for a career as a Regular Army soldier was a pre-World War II brochure which stated that officers stationed in the Far East (which then meant only China and the Philippines) had the choice of returning to the United States by boat via Europe (around the world, no less!) or over the Trans-Siberian Railway via Harbin, Moscow and Paris.

It is getting commonplace to go "around the world" now. But there are other little gimmicks we could use. Returning from Europe on the SS *United States* is a prerogative of very senior officers, but a fair number of spaces are filled by Sp.5's who are just overjoyed by the privilege, but thoroughly confused as to how they got it. Why not dangle the vacant cabins as reenlistment bait, or reward for superior achievement? The plan for obtaining extensions in Vietnam is highly attractive: 30 days of leave, with free travel to anywhere and back. I know one young chopper pilot who asked for leave in Switzerland. His ticket read San Francisco, New York, Frankfurt, Athens, Karachi, Bangkok, Saigon. Why not do something similar for first-term RA enlistments, using Military Airlift Command routes only, but including the wife and kids? Costs money? Certainly. But I think it will pay off more than the same sum of money spread out as a pay raise for every E-5 and E-6 in the Army.

The United States Army has been good to me. I signed up for 30 and have completed 25. I will go the route. I have been to three wars; each time I was scared, and each time my wife cried. But neither of us complained; that is what soldiering is all about. I have cut my hair the way I want (short). I have lived in privacy, if not in comfort, in a refurbished chicken coop and in a crudely "converted" barracks. The Army let me go to school in my spare time, and I will leave the service with degrees on the wall I did not have when I came in. My pay is not at all bad, and with the security I have had in Regular Army status I have been able to set aside enough to send three kids to college without borrowing. The Army has given me a full and rewarding life.

Let's give the same to our enlisted soldiers.

▲

Along With the Other Gear

It was going to be a long night. We were in the field for maneuvers, and to pass the time the men began talking about their home towns.

Throughout the conversation the sergeant major had remained quiet and pensive. Finally, I asked, "By the way, sergeant major, where were *you* born?"

To this he calmly looked up and answered, in all seriousness, "Sir, I was issued at Fort Lee, Virginia."

LT. JOE WILLIAMS

▲

Conversation Piece

Col. Emily C. Gorman, a firm but gracious lady, tells of receiving an unexpected telephone call from a high-ranking officer on the Army Staff while she was director of the Women's Army Corps.

"What is your policy on wigs?" the officer asked abruptly.

Not having a policy on wigs, and being wiser than to invent one on the spur of the moment, Col. Gorman explained that there was no policy. However, she went on, as appearance was the criterion, if the wig contributed to a pleasing appearance, there would seem to be no objection.

Then, with what telling effect she did not know at the time, she added:

"I believe, sir, the Army has no policy on the wearing of toupées."

LT. COL. RUBY R. STAUBER

While you're saving money for college, make sure there's a college to save money for.



There are all kinds of ways to save money for a college education.

A good savings account.

Life insurance.

Or U.S. Savings Bonds.

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Let's say you buy your one-year-old son a $25 Bond every month. When he's 18 and ready for college, he'll have $5,506.

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Savings Bonds now pay a new higher rate—4¼%—when held to maturity of 7 years.

And if they're lost, stolen, or destroyed, the Treasury Department will replace them free.


Also, with each Series E Bond you buy, you're entitled to buy the same or lower denomination Freedom Share.

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Any way you look at it, buying U.S. Savings Bonds makes sense.

They not only get the kids ready for college.

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
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Hole-Hunting For Dragon's Teeth



By Lt. Col. Richard W. Smith, *U.S. Marine Corps, and* Lt. Col. Norman L. Tiller Sr., *U.S. Army*

Like the dragon's teeth of the ancient Greek myth, subterranean Viet Cong bunkers sprout soldiers out of nowhere. Here is the story of how one battalion learned to root the enemy out of his holes.

To kill a guerrilla, you must find him. The guerrilla in Vietnam is an expert at not being found. Sometimes it seems as if the ground has opened and swallowed him. Frequently it has! This article tells how one U.S. Army battalion made the earth give up its secrets.

In the spring of 1967, Task Force Oregon was operating in the southern part of I Corps in the Republic of Vietnam. Between 15 April and 1 June one of its units, the 2d Battalion of the 35th Infantry, had seven major contacts with NVA and main force Viet Cong battalions.

After 1 June, the nature of the conflict changed. The enemy shifted to what he called "anti-sweep operations." As American forces swept an area, they would be engaged by squad-size enemy forces at ranges of 300 to 500 meters. After inflicting casualties and disrupting the sweep, the VC simply disappeared. The frustrated lead elements would find hot brass but no enemy.

The Americans varied their techniques, employing cordons and keeping aircraft overhead, but with no significant success. Military intelligence and common sense indicated that the enemy had "gone to ground," but detailed searches failed to dig him out.

The break came on 10 July, when a captured VC volunteered to lead them to some hiding places. He showed them some underground shelters that they must have walked over often in their searches but which were virtually invisible to the closest inspection. The battalion commander brought in all his company commanders and other key people, and they made a detailed study of the construction, location and concealment of each hiding


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LT. COL. RICHARD W. SMITH, U.S. Marine Corps, who served in Vietnam as G3 (operations officer) of the 1st Marine Division, is on the staff of the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico. LT. COL. NORMAN L. TILLER Sr., Infantry, who commanded the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, during the events described in this article, is stationed at Fort Ord, Calif.














THE UNVEILING

The well camouflaged trapdoor is difficult to locate in upper left photo. Top right, some of the camouflage has been removed and the shape of the trapdoor emerges. Discovered (lower left), the VC emerges. (Note the beveled edges of trapdoor.) Looking down into tunnel (bottom right) one can see the wooden frame used to support door to tunnel entrance.







These cross-section drawings show the subterranean details of typical Viet Cong underground shelters. At upper left is the most common layout, dug beneath clumps of bamboo or other vegetation, concealing the air tubes and entrances. Ventilation tubes are usually hollowed-out bamboo sections, sometimes forming part of a surface structure, as at upper right. Shelters near streams (right) usually had a water-hole entrance.

place. Based on this inspection, the battalion began a "hole-hunting" campaign. In 30 days it killed 386 enemy and captured 77, and seized 158 weapons while suffering only 12 killed in action. One of ten battalions in Task Force Oregon, the 2/35th accounted for one-third of all enemy killed and over 40 percent of all weapons captured during this period. They killed the second in command and three company commanders of one VC battalion and captured its S4 and sergeant major. A kill ratio of 32 to one was attained.

The key was their intelligent inspection of those first hiding places. In subsequent operations the battalion applied what they had learned, and each new success brought more information. Well over a thousand "holes" were discovered in the next few months.

Basically, these shelters could be classed according to their location. Some 90 percent were dug under vegetation, usually bamboo clumps. The rest were found in sandy soil such as beaches, or near streams or water-filled craters. Those near streams usually had a water-hole entrance.

These hiding places were surprisingly uniform, normally with a floor area eight feet square and a height of three feet. Most were in or near villages, some behind or beneath family bunkers. Those at the corner of a field permitted good concealment and good visibility in the one main direction of approach.

The shelters were usually entered by a rectangular spider-hole opening in the ground, about 12 inches by 18 inches. The real secret of the concealment lay in the covers for these openings. These consisted of trays or planter boxes with bevelled edges to fit snugly into the aperture. Grass, small bushes and other vegetation were planted in the boxes. With the tray in place, a man could walk over the entrance without suspecting its presence. Variations included planters made of bamboo, woven baskets and even concrete.

Ventilation for the shelters was provided by hollowed-out bamboo sections thrust down through the ground into the hiding place. The pole's upper end, which extended three to six inches above the ground, was concealed in clumps of living bamboo or under thorny cactus-type plants that discouraged investigation. In some instances, the air tube was a longer pole that was part of some above-ground lean-to or shelter.

To find these subterranean hiding places the 2d Battalion evolved painstaking techniques. From pressure and unrelenting pursuit, they shifted to the role of patient hunter. When the enemy broke contact and disappeared, or when warning signals had been heard, the soldiers clamped a lid on the area and began their detailed search. Rifle companies were assigned search areas never larger than 1,000 meters square and frequently as small as 500 meters square. The company then systematically and painstakingly searched every square meter. While part of the force provided security, the rest quietly searched for clues. As the soldier became more experienced, the clues became more revealing.

Frequently one or two old men or women would be found in and around areas which showed signs of recent habitation. Their job was to help put the "lid" in place and blend the vegetation in the planter box with that around it. The location of these "noncombatants" helped narrow the area to be searched.

Once the search narrowed to a general area, several visual indicators or clues proved helpful in locating the holes. Worn places on the bamboo that the enemy had used to lower himself into his hole were good indicators. Another was a small path, much like a small game trail, leading through the brush into a clump of bamboo. Easily seen, though not a sure sign, was cut bamboo. Frequently the Viet Cong dug their holes under these partially harvested bamboo clumps. Bamboo was in widespread use to shore up the excavation, especially in areas where the soil was sandy.

A good visual indicator, but one difficult for the novice hole-hunter to detect, was a slight depression in the ground in or near the bamboo clump. This depression, often marking the location of the trapdoor itself, collected leaves and debris and aided in camouflaging the hole entrance.

Surest of all indicators was the indispensable air hole.

Freshly cooked food with no one attending the pot was a sure sign that the VC had departed in haste and were probably hiding nearby. Another reliable giveaway was the presence of human feces near likely hiding places. On several occasions, detailed search in a radius of several meters from the location of such signs revealed the location of the hole.

The hunters discovered that short pieces of sharpened bamboo made efficient probes, because the hole entrances were covered by only a couple of inches of earth and vegetation.

Finding the hiding place was half the battle. Then the question was, "Who (or what) is inside?" Only about 15 percent of the holes were occupied, but a higher percentage contained weapons, ammunition and equipment, making them valuable finds as well.

Every entrance cover or lid had to be treated as if it were booby-trapped, and in many instances it was. A favorite enemy tactic was to throw out a grenade when the searchers bunched up around an opening. There were some sad experiences from this until the lesson had been absorbed.

Most lids were equipped with wire handles on top and bottom to permit lifting or pulling into place. In at least one instance a VC and a GI engaged in a tug-of-war to see whether the cover would stay in place.

Once the trapdoor to the hole had been found, reduction began with one or two M16 magazines fired through the "lid." This set the scene for the attempt to talk any occupants into surrendering by letting them know that the jig was up. The firing also set up enough disturbance to set off pressure-type booby-trap devices, usually blowing a hole in the trapdoor large enough to allow insertion of a grenade. After this "attention-getter," various Vietnamese expressions were shouted into the hole exhorting the enemy to come out or be killed. Sometimes he gave up without a fight, which not only saved the effort of killing him but facilitated the subsequent search for weapons and documents. When all else failed and the hard-core Charlie remained in his self-created tomb, a few well placed fragmentation grenades usually reduced both tunnel and occupants to rubble.

As a further precaution against booby traps, a grenade was placed on top of the trapdoor and detonated. This had the added benefit of having the concussion reveal other entrances or air vents. Sometimes an air vent was enlarged and a grenade pushed through it. This was effective against enemy in tunnels or holes equipped with grenade baffles at the entrance.

The last step was the search by a "tunnel rat" to ensure that all documents and weapons had been recovered.


The 2d Battalion's enthusiasm grew in proportion to its successes. Everyone wanted to search, and it became a problem to keep enough men at the security job. The battalion commander made sure that men who found enemy materiel were allowed to keep it, subject only to intelligence requirements. The finding of a cache of 50 VC flags provided a tremendous incentive.

The results of these techniques are noteworthy. In one 60-day period the battalion killed 800 enemy and captured 275, mostly by hole-hunting. The kill ratio was substantially higher when using these methods than in the most favorable solid contacts where aided by friendly air and artillery. The percentage of weapons captured was much higher, an important consideration in this type of warfare.

Finally, a higher percentage of enemy killed or captured were local force troops, troops on whom the main force elements depended for food, guides and contact with the local populace. The VC chief of Mo Duc District, a hard man to replace, was killed by application of these techniques. Others of the unseen communist structure, such as economic cadre, youth leaders and propaganda teams, were also killed or captured.

In one dramatic contact south of the Song Ve (River), the 2d Battalion killed a dozen enemy before the VC broke off and disappeared. A few months before, this might have ended the engagement but, employing their new-found skills, the GIs dug them out, killed 65 and captured three. Captured records indicated that, of the enemy company's 69 men, only one remained alive and uncaptured.

The significance of these successes will not be lost on soldiers who have suffered the frustration of "losing" an enemy force after a brief, hard-gained contact. Until now our tactics have perforce centered around finding an enemy force and inflicting the heaviest damage before it can break away. When hole-hunting techniques become part of every soldier's training, the enemy will learn that the earth which has been his refuge may well become his grave.



At Sikorsky, advanced materials are already off the ground.

December 1968: first flight of a Sikorsky S-61 helicopter with boron and glass fiber reinforced tail rotor blades.

That was the first successful flight of a helicopter with a primary structure made of an advanced composite material. The new blades are lighter, stronger and stiffer than the metal ones now used in production aircraft. And they show remarkable resistance to fatigue and corrosion...promising substantial increases in blade life.

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
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The finest army in U.S. history is tactically supreme in Vietnam but a final decision remains elusive. With the South Vietnamese preparing to take over more of the fighting, perhaps it is time to think again about the . . .

INDIRECT APPROACH

By Lt. Col. Richard A. McMahon

In the Republic of Vietnam the United States has fielded as fine an army as any in its history. It is well led, and the morale of its troops is high. It has the best of air and naval backing, and its mobility and logistical support are unequaled. It is fighting extremely well and has inflicted heavy casualties upon the enemy. In the words of Gen. William C. Westmoreland, who commanded all U.S. forces there from January 1964 to June 1968, "They have defeated every enemy main force that they have met."

Yet, although we have prevented the enemy from winning military victory, we have been unable to gain our own. The enemy remains willing and able to carry on the war, and shows no sign of suspending hostilities, except on his own terms.

When a fighting machine as good as this one is unable to achieve its purpose, the reasons probably lie not with the forces in the field but with the strategy governing their employment.

Our strategy in this war has been essentially one of the direct approach; one which chooses as its primary objective the destruction of the enemy's armed forces by direct means—in other words, by bringing them to battle. This, of course, is the heritage of Clausewitz, the dictum that the destruction of the enemy force is the primary purpose of war, and can best be done by a general engagement. It is the strategy which was applied so successfully by the Allies in Europe during the Second World War, resulting in the collapse of the German Army. It is still advocated by many strategic planners today as the surest, quickest way to gain a military decision.

The theory of the indirect approach was first defined by Britain's Sir Basil Liddell Hart. Basically, the indirect approach seeks to dislocate the enemy rather than destroy him. It is a strategy which tries to reduce physical combat to the absolute minimum. It relies heavily on surprise and psychological means to lower the enemy's morale, and upon maneuver to disrupt his dispositions, interdict his lines of supply and cut off his routes of escape.

This theory has not gone uncriticized. There are those who like to point out that according to Liddell Hart, anything that succeeds is an indirect approach, while anything that fails is not. And, in his book, *Military Strategy*, Rear Adm. J. C. Wylie complains that Liddell Hart's theory of the indirect approach is "formless, slippery and nebulous."

But the theory has many admirers.

Gen. Yigal Yadin, chief of the Israeli General Staff at



the time of the Arab-Israeli War of 1948-1949, states that the doctrine of the indirect approach contributed significantly to the Israeli success in that war. Field Marshal Lord Montgomery has written that Liddell Hart has produced "a theory or doctrine of war, as did Clausewitz and Jomini, but whereas they were often wrong, Liddell Hart has proved to be generally right."

In this article I hope to show that insurgents employ an indirect approach strategy, and that the same strategy is needed to defeat them.

So much has been written about insurgency in the last few years that it is not necessary here to go into any great detail concerning its strategy.

It is generally agreed that the insurgent's main objective —heavily emphasized by both Mao Tse-tung and Vo Nguyen Giap—is to win the support of the people. Once the insurgent has formed a solid base of support there, guerrilla warfare begins, gradually escalating through several phases as successes are won, until the legal regime is overthrown in a final phase of conventional warfare.

A favorite tactic of the insurgent, overlooked by many writers, is in the field of political or psychological warfare. This is what might be called the tactic of "promises." The insurgent promises land reform to the peasant oppressed by landlords and moneylenders, autonomy to ethnic groups or tribes, self-government to hamlets and villages. The insurgent can promise almost anything since he knows he need deliver nothing until victory is won. It is an excellent tactic. It has the further advantage that, once the insurgent is in power, he need not deliver anything at all. Further, the legal government cannot counter him effectively merely by promising in its turn; it must deliver—now, by actual performance. This may be difficult or impossible in the middle of an insurgency.

Most writers agree that once insurgency begins, the guerrilla will try to seize and hold the initiative by constantly harassing or attacking government forces. Liddell Hart believes that the insurgent *must* maintain the offensive, and that "a guerrilla movement that puts safety first will soon wither."

However, this is not completely correct. One of the insurgent's primary objectives is survival—not necessarily personal survival, but survival as a force in being. He will not willingly adopt any plan or tactic which will endanger this survival. He realizes that if he is annihilated, his movement may die with him. He knows also that in counterinsurgency warfare, the last army left in the field is the winner.

The insurgent first seeks to dislocate the government's military force, rather than destroy it. He prefers Lenin's advice: "The soundest strategy in war is to postpone operations until the moral disintegration of the enemy renders the delivery of the mortal blow both possible and easy."

His primary objective is to deny the people the protection of their government's armed forces by attacking troops and their rear areas, supply lines, flanks and other weak points.

LT. COL. RICHARD A. McMAHON, Military Intelligence, commanded an intelligence unit in Vietnam in 1966 before moving to the J2 staff of CINCPAC. After completing the course at the Army War College, he has returned to the Far East.

He chooses the line of least resistance by adopting as his main objective, winning over the people rather than destroying the enemy army. He attacks only where his foe is weakest, and only when success is certain.

He chooses the line of least expectation by exploiting surprise and darkness.

He selects alternate objectives and tries to confuse his opponent as to the direction or object of his current operation.

He prefers jungle, mountain or other difficult terrain to the risk of facing government forces in the open; poor weather and darkness compensate for his opponent's superior force.

With insurgency thus defined as employing basically a strategy of indirect approach, let us see if a similar counterinsurgency strategy can be defined.

First of all, such a strategy by government forces would aim at dislocating insurgent forces rather than the far more difficult task of destroying them. It would avoid search-and-destroy operations in favor of clear-and-hold actions designed to drive the insurgent permanently and completely from his population base. It would concentrate on securing and winning over the people, rather than annihilating the insurgent. It would rely on intensive patrolling by small units and highly effective intelligence agencies to find insurgent bases and caches, and to round up insurgent leaders, agents and sympathizers.

It would choose the line of least resistance by avoiding direct battle except on the most favorable conditions, concentrating instead on interdicting supply lines, bombarding base areas with air and artillery, and mounting a massive psychological warfare effort.

It would take the line of least expectation by refusing to seek out the insurgent on his own ground, and by at first surrendering parts of the country to insurgent control. It would adopt a strategy that appeared defensive (clear-and-hold) but which would actually be offensive (gradually expanding control over an ever-larger population base).

Its multiple objectives would be local security, government reform, harassment of the insurgent and interdiction of his supplies, all of which lead to his defeat. The tactics employed would seek combinations of these objectives simultaneously, emphasis shifting from one to another to take advantage of local success.

It would use weather and terrain to its advantage, by yielding to the insurgent only the most difficult parts of the country. While this is the very terrain in which he at first prefers to fight, he cannot prevail if he remains there. It is sparsely populated, usually inhospitable and its nature makes it difficult for him to resupply.

It may be helpful now to consider the elements of the strategy of indirect approach.

Strong arguments may be raised against a clear-and-hold strategy as the main effort in counterinsurgency. The most important of these is that it is too defensive and surrenders the initiative. Most current literature on counterinsurgency asserts that in order to succeed, the counterinsurgent must push vigorously into insurgent-held territory, contact enemy main units and force them into open combat. They must be kept off balance through constant offensive action. It is Clausewitz again: the only way to



A flight of the Royal Air Force Regiment's No. 91 Rifle Squadron closes in on a wounded bandit during a 1952 operation in Malaya. British forces successfully applied the indirect approach to counter-guerrilla warfare in the 1948-57 "emergency", where lack of an insurgent sanctuary made it particularly suitable.

win a war is to destroy the enemy force through decisive battle. That is the strategy of the direct approach, the one that has predominated in Vietnam, and it has failed.

To counter this argument, we can point out that it is not at all certain that employing U.S. forces in large-scale search-and-destroy operations has always held the initiative. The enemy doesn't think so. In an interview with a South Vietnamese newsman, representatives of the National Liberation Front boasted that during 1967 they moved our forces around at will, first from Saigon to Tay Ninh, then to the Dak To area, then to the DMZ. Some of our own writers and newsmen also believe we are reacting to the enemy's strategy, allowing him to lure our major units away from populated areas, so that he can continue to retain control over the people. If this is true, it is a strong argument in favor of a clear-and-hold policy.


Search-and-destroy operations, far from insuring that government forces hold the initiative, actually surrender some aspects of the initiative. The enemy can choose whether he wishes to fight the force entering his jungle lair or to refuse combat and simply withdraw. The enemy decides the nature of the combat. Shall he lure the government force into a carefully prepared ambush, merely harass it, or stubbornly defend and counterattack? The choice is his, and the government force must be prepared to deal with any and all of them.

Much has been said about the value of the "base area" to the insurgent, but not enough about its drawbacks. The insurgent chooses to operate there out of weakness. It conceals and protects him from the government's superior forces and weapons. But, as previously pointed out, it is usually a difficult place in which to live—short of food and difficult to supply. Most important, the insurgent cannot win if he remains there. The countryside—his main objective—is thinly peopled; in order to prevail, he must eventually campaign in the more populated areas. Mao acknowledged this when he wrote that insurgents "temporarily shift large guerrilla formations to some mountainous region, so that they can reform and resume their activities in the plains once the main forces of the enemy move away." The fact that the enemy must operate in difficult terrain does not mean that he likes it, or that it does not take its toll. Geography and the elements should be given more opportunity to help defeat the enemy, as they have done countless times in the history of warfare.


Sir Robert Thompson, of Malaya fame, has long counseled against search-and-destroy operations and has been a strong proponent of the clear-and-hold strategy. Years ago he proposed such a strategy to President Diem, and he still thinks it is the only path to success. The importance of such a policy was also recognized by Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh in 1964, when he approved a plan drawn up by the RVN Joint General Staff with assistance from U.S. advisors. Known as the *Chien Thang* (Victory) Plan, it was nothing more than the old "spreading oil spot" theory of Marshal Louis Lyautey—nothing new, but as applicable today as when it was first proposed. Col. Robert M. Montague, in a study on pacification prepared at the Army War College (1966), describes the concept: "According to the plan, secure areas would be first strengthened to become viable bases or 'oil spots' and then control would be gradually expanded from secure to less secure areas, from populous to less populous areas, and generally along important lines of communication."

What the opponents of a clear-and-hold strategy perhaps fail to appreciate is that it is not defensive, but offensive. Although it establishes a defensive ambush belt around a particular populated area, it is not static. Once it has established positive security and control in the first area, it moves forward, slowly but inexorably encompassing more and more people. This is extremely annoying to the insurgent. It removes him from his population base, denies him his objective and gradually shrinks the area in which he can operate. Mao has pointed out that it would be intolerable for an insurgency force to sit idly by without fighting in such a situation. The elder Moltke said, "A clever military leader will succeed in many cases in choosing defensive positions of such an offensive nature from the strategic point of view that the enemy is compelled to attack us in them." Faced with the loss of his population base, the insurgent will be forced to attack the government's defensive belt. Knowing this, government forces should be ready with carefully prepared defense and counterattack plans.

The successful "Briggs Plan" in Malaya (named for Lt.



Phase I: Secure the city of Sava.



Phase II: Secure populated area of Dabu River.

Gen. Sir Harold Briggs, director of operations) was based on a strategy of securing and controlling populated areas, fragmenting the insurgent organizations, isolating the insurgents, and eventually destroying them by forcing them to attack government forces.

Critics may point out that the theory of forcing the insurgent to attack at a place chosen by government forces was discredited by the disaster that resulted when the French tried it at Dien Bien Phu. However, the French failure was due not to faulty strategy but to misjudgment of the enemy's strength, selection of a poor battleground, and inability to supply and reinforce once battle was joined. Thus, the French were heavily outnumbered and outgunned while occupying untenable terrain. Their failure does not discredit the strategy. We have it on the authority of Gen. Giap, who told *Paris Match* in 1955, "I don't understand why you criticize your soldiers. Dien Bien Phu was perhaps the most dangerous thing for us they could have done."

But forcing the enemy to attack on terms favorable to the government forces is only one object of clear-and-hold operations. The primary purpose is to assure permanent control of and security for the people. Their security must be recognized as essential if their support is to be gained. As Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge noted, "You can't win the heart and mind of a man if he has a knife sticking two inches into his belly. The first thing you have to do is get the knife out."

Resistance to a clear-and-hold policy also emanates from another "principle" of counterinsurgency warfare: "destruction of the insurgent's armed forces is to be preferred to the conquest of territories." However, this principle, although generally valid, must not overlook the fact that people live on land. They do not want to move to refugee centers and they do not want to be herded into armed camps. Experience has shown that most attempts to make them do so have failed. The government must hold that part of the land where the most of the people live. So long as the insurgent can attack or infiltrate populated areas, counterinsurgency will fail, regardless of how many search-and-destroy operations go off into the jungles. A search-and-destroy strategy cannot provide on-the-spot, permanent security for the people. A clear-and-hold strategy can.

Security of the people, although it establishes a favorable atmosphere, does not automatically insure their support. A corrupt or oppressive government will alienate the people and give the insurgent the fuel he needs to keep the insurgency going.


Contrary to a widely held belief, not all insurgencies spring from international communist plots; many arise from some form of dissatisfaction with the government. A government with an active insurgency on its hands, which fails to recognize this dissatisfaction and to act to correct legitimate grievances, plays into the insurgent's hands. On the other hand, a government which acts quickly to correct these things undercuts the insurgent by taking the revolution away from the revolutionary. Meeting legitimate demands while parrying others with good psychological warfare—if done in time—provides an excellent prospect of terminating the insurgency before it reaches a stage requiring military force.

A corrupt or oppressive regime cannot really win a counterinsurgency campaign. Even if it temporarily stamps out the insurgency, the old reasons for resistance will still remain, ready to be fanned into flame once more. Such a regime raises problems for those nations which might want to assist it. A nation which comes to the aid of a corrupt and oppressive regime will most likely be tarred with the same brush and be criticized for misusing its wealth and power.


Thus, government reform qualifies as an indirect approach to countering an insurgency, since reform strikes at the roots of disaffection rather than merely at the trunk and branches. It was recognized as essential in defeating insurgencies in Malaya and the Philippines. Unfortunately, this lesson has not yet been fully learned in Vietnam.

Opting for a clear-and-hold strategy does not mean that government forces must sit and wait for the enemy to attack. Instead of large-scale search-and-destroy operations, ambushes would be laid and many small patrols would roam the area beyond the defensive belt, constantly seeking large enemy units, supply caches and base areas, which would then be attacked by air strikes. Large government units would not normally be committed to these tasks; they would refuse to fight on the insurgent's terms and ground, where a reception has been carefully prepared.

In Vietnam, U.S. forces have to some extent fallen under



Phase III: Extend control of the Dabu River valley.



Phase IV: Consolidate control of the populated area.

the spell of their own tremendous mobility. Our large fleets of helicopters can take us almost anywhere. Under a clear-and-hold strategy, instead of moving forces into the insurgent's stronghold, helicopters would be used to reinforce parts of the defensive-ambush belt under attack, or to counterattack an enemy force or cut off its escape. They would take advantage of positive intelligence, such as in destroying supply caches, or in swooping down suddenly on a base or reserve areas when surprise was assured.

Every effort would be made to interdict the insurgent's supply lines with both air and artillery and, when appropriate, with small airborne strike teams. Heavy bomber strikes, such as those now being used, would allow the insurgent no rest in his ever-shrinking area of operations. If the insurgents are supported by a third country, all possible direct and diplomatic pressures would be applied to end such assistance. Whenever possible, borders would be sealed.

Intelligence would be an active arm against the insurgent. Within the defensive-ambush belt, constant counterintelligence would ferret out enemy agents still in the area, or those able to infiltrate it. When the defensive belt moved forward to absorb another populated area, intelligence would have already singled out the insurgents, their families and their sympathizers, who would be isolated from the rest of the people. In the insurgent-controlled area outside the defensive belt, a combination of human and mechanical means would find base areas, supply lines, caches and reserves. Roving agents and long-range reconnaissance patrols would complement our most sophisticated equipment. However, enthusiasm for the latest gadgets should not obscure the fact that in counterinsurgency the most valuable "sensor" is a reliable human being, since only another human can distinguish an insurgent from a peaceful citizen. This must be a native effort. As Maj. Gen. Duong Van ("Big") Minh has pointed out, only agents recruited from local people can be effective; those from government bureaus or from other districts can work only under immense difficulties, and foreigners not at all.

A massive psychological effort would be launched concurrently with all these actions. Again, the field is so well documented there is no need to go into detail. Leaflets, broadcasts and loudspeakers would all spread subtle, intelligent propaganda designed to subvert the insurgent's loyalty and destroy his morale. Bounties and rewards for information, weapons, supply caches, and the like, payable to both insurgents and informers, would be vigorously exploited. Well publicized and religiously respected amnesty and resettlement would be offered the insurgent.


To illustrate the concept of the indirect approach proposed in this article, I have drawn up an example of a possible clear-and-hold operation. It offers no original or startling doctrine—similar models are studied at service schools and have been proposed by various research agencies. Mine is intended to afford a graphic example of how a clear-and-hold strategy, as defined in this article, can bring security to the people and ultimately defeat an insurgent without seeking out and destroying his main force units. The area is shown in the four sketches.

In Phase I, the mission is to secure the city of Sava by establishing a tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) as shown, with military units manning the perimeter defenses and roadblocks and providing internal security. Expansion of the police force begins when they establish check points and guard vital installations. Intelligence units and the police ferret out enemy agents, cadre, sympathizers, and others. Government reform and civic action begin, along with formation, recruiting and training of the home guard.

Patrol and ambush zones are established and manned by military forces. The utmost effort is made to eliminate armed insurgents. The zone is saturated with intelligence means, and psychological warfare and limited civic action are carried out. A free fire zone is established in the insurgent's base area, and suspected insurgent locations are attacked by air and artillery.

In the second phase, the mission is to secure the populated area of the Dabu River and set up the Sava base area. The police and home guard units are given the task of internal security. The local government is strengthened and civic action shifts into high gear.

Next, the TAOR is established (to include the Sava base area). Troops man the perimeter defenses and roadblocks and provide internal security. Measures for controlling the people are carried out, and police and intelligence units round up insurgent undercover agents. Civic action is now at its highest. A loyal local government is established and



A Filipino policeman searches bus passengers for weapons at one of the numerous checkpoints set up during operations against Huk terrorists in the mid-1950s. Civil authorities gradually assume internal security tasks as government-held areas steadily expand.

recruiting for the home guard begins from the new population base.

Extension of patrols and expansion of the ambush zone are the same as in Phase I.

Long-range patrols are seeking strike targets in the insurgent base area. Harassment by air and artillery continues.

The mission in Phase III is to extend control of the Dabu River Valley.

The area of the Sava base is expanded through the same actions as in Phase II. Local elections are held.

To expand the TAOR, the same actions take place as in Phase II, except that the home guard takes over the security of the internal TAOR.

Patrols are extended and ambush zones expanded through the same actions as in Phase II.

Small-unit strikes are carried out against located targets in the insurgent's base area. Long-range patrols and harassment by fire continue.

The final phase aims at consolidating the control of the populated area.

The Sava base area is expanded through the same actions as in Phase III. Restrictive measures for controlling the people (such as curfew and off-limits) can now be relaxed.

Expansion of the TAOR is done in the same way as in Phase III. Local governments are affirmed by elections. Government gains are consolidated, mistakes corrected, and the utmost effort directed toward improving economic and social conditions. Home guard units begin to assist regular forces in manning perimeter defenses.

Patrol and ambush areas are established in the insurgent's base area through the same actions as in Phase III.

The best live example of a successful indirect approach strategy is probably the British experience in Malaya. Here, British and Malayan forces avoided large-scale combat and relied heavily on a clear-and-hold strategy. As Sir Robert Thompson has stated, the main effort was on defeating the insurgency, rather than the guerrillas. Both Sir Robert and Brig. R. L. Clutterbuck, each of whom spent many years in Malaya, point out that when large military forces were used, they were almost always unsuccessful. They both strongly oppose search-and-destroy operations and favor some form of clear-and-hold policy.

Major emphasis was also placed on winning over the people by redress of grievances and by good government which clearly looked to their interests. Most important, the guerrillas were gradually isolated from the people. Cut off from sources of supplies, recruits and intelligence, and confined to inhospitable areas, their organization weakened and died. While it was a long war, once the winning strategy was adopted, the insurgency went steadily downhill to what appears to this day to be permanent defeat.

Another instance of the indirect approach was the campaign in the Philippines. Col. Napoleon D. Valeriano and Lt. Col. Charles T. R. Bohannan, in their book, *Counter-Guerrilla Operations* (1963), point out that success against the Huks was largely due to indirect, unconventional methods. Again, main emphasis was on satisfying the legitimate aspirations of the people and on good government. Large-scale operations were unsuccessful, so government forces quickly shifted to small-unit, unconventional tactics, assigned areas to commanders, and emphasized intelligence collection, patrolling and ambushing.

In a nearly perfect statement of the case for the indirect approach, they write, "To kill an enemy, it is necessary to use a weapon on him. To capture him usually requires demonstrating the imminent effective use of a weapon. To cause his surrender—or resignation from the war—it is necessary only to overcome his will to continue to fight. This may be the easiest and cheapest solution."

Fortunately, there is some indication that certain Latin American countries plagued with insurgencies are taking as their model the British experience in Malaya rather than the American one in Vietnam. Counterinsurgency in Colombia stresses civic action designed to gain the loyalty of the poor farmer, while military operations concentrate

on long-range patrolling, ambushes, and tracking and surveillance, followed by assault by small helicopter-borne forces.

Similarly, in Guatemala the government has formed many civic action teams and has sponsored armed "peasant vigilante" groups like the home guard units in Malaya. As a result, the guerrilla movement has greatly diminished.

Admittedly, neither of these American republics has solved its insurgency problem. In both countries a vital part of the indirect approach strategy remains to be carried out: government reform. It is not unrealistic to expect that programs responding to economic and social needs would knock the last props from under the insurgents.

These, then, are some of the elements of an indirect approach strategy to counter insurgency. No claim is made that they are complete or all-inclusive. It can be reasonably argued that they cannot be applied in Vietnam, because the situation has gone far beyond the bounds of insurgency. Regular army divisions from North Vietnam that have invaded the South are supplied from the North. It can also be argued that while most of the tactics proposed in this article have been employed in one form or another in Vietnam, apparently they have been no more successful than the direct approach. The fact is, however, that they have not been given a chance to prove themselves. They have taken a back seat to our major strategy of search-and-destroy. No strategy will be successful unless the main effort, or at least sufficient effort, is put behind it.

Gen. Harold K. Johnson, in the *Army Digest* of April 1968, wrote that our strategy in Vietnam is twofold, combining both search-and-destroy and security operations. He also pointed out that emphasis is on search-and-destroy and that it must remain there; that any change in this emphasis would "free the enemy to operate with relative impunity" outside our cleared area. However, the point overlooked here is that once government forces hold the major populated areas—*really* hold them—the enemy can be permitted to operate outside them, subject to harassing operations, until government forces are ready to recover the next chunk of populated area from him. There may even be broad areas of mountainous jungle that friendly forces will not attempt to bring under control at all. The insurgent cannot win if he remains there, so he must choose between seeing his movement wither or attacking government forces under highly unfavorable conditions.

It is time we heeded Sir Robert Thompson's advice, which he has been trying to get us to do from his vantage point of over 12 years in Malaya and Vietnam: "The main emphasis should be given to defeating subversion, not the guerrillas, and that the government must secure its base areas first."

This has never really been done in Vietnam despite mountains of statistics showing percentages of hamlets secured and multi-colored maps portraying land areas held by government forces. The enemy still strikes at will, evidenced by his attacks on Saigon and the occupation of Hue during the Tet offensive of 1968, and the more recent attacks by fire throughout the country designed to put pressure on our negotiators in Paris and to influence the Midway talks. We have not secured the base area and nowhere are people safe from terrorist attack. Instead of defeating the subversion, we have been trying to subdue the guerrilla by chasing him all over South Vietnam. It is time we reversed the process.

The late Bernard Fall noted that our efforts in Vietnam would not make any strategically significant gains until we had enough troops to permanently hold the areas we clear. We have enough troops in Vietnam to do this if search-and-destroy operations are abandoned or sharply reduced. Several studies have outlined in detail a strategy of indirect approach, and responsible voices are calling for its institution.

The direct approach strategy has failed. If no settlement comes out of the negotiations in Paris, perhaps it is time we gave the indirect approach a chance.

▲

What's In a Name (Tag)?

Several years ago, while serving as an instructor at Fort Devens, Mass., I was standing near a classroom door to mentally note the name tags of a new group of students, as they entered the room.

The names passed by in orderly fashion . . . Burch, Warner, Perry, Adams, Schmuck . . . Schmuck! "Nobody, but nobody, has a name like Schmuck," I thought to myself.

But this thought was silently answered like a "mind-blowing" experience by the very next name tag I saw which read: Whynot.

SP. 4 ROBERT H. WRIGHT

▲

No Idle Idols

Before the Communists ran us out, we who were with the U.S. Army advisory group lived in the Shanghai Science Institute compound which was surrounded by a high wall. At the gate on Rue de Ghisi were two huge stone figures of warriors. Such figures were placed at the entrances of important estates to protect the residents from devils.

My ever inquisitive wife, who wanted to learn everything about China, said to our native nurse:


"Ruey, what means big statue at gate?"

Ruey, whose English was basically basic, puzzled for a few seconds. Then her face lighted up as she replied:

"Ah so, missy—alla same MPs."

LT. COL. ARTHUR J. HOGAN
AUS, retired

Vietnam Vets Honored





Colorado's Governor John Love (above) headed the guest list at the Western-style dinner hosted by AUSA's Pikes Peak Chapter. Just visible between the ten-gallons of the youngsters ladling out the governor's chuck wagon fare is Maj. Roger H. D. Donlon, of Fort Carson, the Army's first Vietnam Medal of Honor winner. Harry W. Hoth (left), president of Pikes Peak Chapter of AUSA, was suitably attired for the chapter's chuck-wagon dinner honoring 300 combat-decorated Vietnam veterans from ARADCOM regions and nearby Fort Carson.

Some 300 members of AUSA's Pikes Peak Chapter were hosts on 20 June at a chuck-wagon dinner near Colorado Springs for 300 combat decorated Vietnam veterans now stationed at Fort Carson and in Army Air Defense Command's (ARADCOM) regions.

Several hundred other guests and tourists swelled attendance to about 1,000.

Heading the guest list were Gov. John Love, of Colorado, and Mayor T. Eugene McCleary, of Colorado Springs, both of whom expressed their gratitude for the services and sacrifices of the soldiers in Vietnam. They shared the spotlight with Maj. Roger H. D. Donlon, of Fort Carson, the Army's first winner of the Medal of Honor in Vietnam.

Senior military commanders present included Lt. Gen. George V. Underwood Jr., ARADCOM commander, and Brig. Gen. Charles Cantrell, assistant commander of the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson.

Chapter President Harry W. Hoth read a letter from Gen. William C. Westmoreland, Army chief of staff, expressing his thanks to the chapter for sponsoring the dinner in coordination with the citizens of Colorado Springs as public recognition of the Vietnam veterans.

Vietnam campaign designations. Three more campaign designations for service in the Republic of Vietnam have been announced by the Department of the Army. The Seventh Campaign, terminated 30 June 1968, is designated "Vietnam Counteroffensive, Phase IV," and the Eighth Campaign from 1 July to 1 November 1968, "Vietnam Counteroffensive, Phase V." The Ninth Campaign is designated as beginning 2 November 1968. Its terminal date and name will be announced later. Any member of the U.S. Army who served or is now serving in Vietnam or surrounding air space or waters during these campaigns is authorized to wear a battle star on the Vietnam service ribbon.

Engineer Hall of Fame. A Hall of Fame honoring graduates of the engineer officer candidate school has been dedicated at Fort Belvoir. Recognition will be given to all graduates who have been awarded the Silver Star, Distinguished Service Cross or Medal of Honor, and to those who reached the rank of colonel or higher while on active duty. All graduates who meet eligibility requirements are encouraged to write to the Commanding Officer, U.S. Army Engineer Officer Candidate Regiment, Fort Belvoir, Va., 22060.

Lightweight helmet being developed. As part of a program for improving basic parts of Army clothing and equipment, the Combat Developments Command at Fort Belvoir, Va., is now designing and testing a replacement for the long-used "steel pot" helmet. Besides being about 50 percent lighter, the new helmet will be better fitting and more protective against concussive shock.

New Patton Museum. The first part of a five-stage construction plan for a new $3 million Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor at Fort Knox, Ky., is scheduled to begin by the end of this year. Exhibits from the present museum, along with a new tank and vehicle display exhibit, will be housed in the first structure. Other stages of construction, expected to be completed by 1975, will include a hall of flags, library, auditorium, administrative facilities and space for additional exhibits.

ROTC panel named. The vacation season has dispersed the anti-military radical communities on the nation's campuses, but there's nothing to indicate that more and even stiffer attacks won't be mounted against ROTC this fall. Before the cadets and their adversaries return, a nine-man DOD advisory committee hopes to have some recommendations on the future of the program for Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird. The panel, made up of six academic executives, two generals and an admiral, will study the whole range of campus-ROTC relationships, as well as the question of administrative uniformity among the programs of the three major

services. Heading the study is Dr. George C. S. Benson, president of Claremont Men's College. Academic colleagues serving with him are: Dr. E. Howard Brooks, vice provost of Stanford University; Dr. Claude E. Hawley, dean of John Jay College, City University of New York; Dr. Herbert E. Longenecker, president of Tulane University; Dr. Donald R. Mallett, vice president and executive dean of Purdue University; and Dr. Dayton S. Pickett, assistant vice chancellor for academic affairs at the University of Illinois. The military representatives are: Brig. Gen. Clifford P. Hannum, USA, deputy director of individual training for ROTC affairs, Department of the Army; Rear Adm. Sheldon H. Kinney, assistant chief for education and training, Bureau of Naval Personnel; and Maj. Gen. Lester Miller, USAF, director of personnel training and education, Department of the Air Force.

New medevac system. The Army is testing a new air-ground system of medical evacuation for use where rapid rescue is otherwise impractical or impossible, such as in counter-insurgency situations and jungle areas. The operation employs a container, dropped into the area by parachute, to transport the casualty. The container is then connected to a tether which is held in the air by a helium-filled balloon. Pick-up is accomplished when an aircraft with a sky hook anchor system attaches to the tether and the container can be pulled into the aircraft.

Names, rank and Soc. Sec. No. Starting 1 July 1969, social security numbers began replacing service numbers to identify all active Army members, reservists and retirees. The old means of identification will be used for those on active duty as of 30 June 1969 until their social security numbers can be entered on their records. Temporary identification numbers are being assigned to individuals coming on active duty without social security numbers.

His bag is snakes. Some of the tallest tales ever to raise hair on a new replacement's neck get told about snakes. Vietnam is no exception, according to one of the Army's leading "snake doctors," now on duty with the 44th Medical Brigade's 20th Preventive Medicine Unit at Bien Hoa. Maj. Herschel H. Flowers cited "continuing legends spread among the troops coming into the country that snakes here are hip-high to a tall Indian. They hear about the two-step snake and the cigarette snake, neither of which exists as described, and some guys worry themselves sick over nothing." Part of Maj. Flowers's job is to separate fact from fancy with a detailed



Maj. Herschel H. Flowers at work.


study of snakes native to Vietnam, and the frequency with which they appear. He already has enough data to suggest that the number of snakes encountered by the average front-line soldier is "quite small—maybe even as few as two or three during an entire year. We know that the importance of snakebite as a factor affecting our troops in a medical sense is practically nil—we simply don't have that many people bitten." But there are still enough bites to lend a sense of urgency to Maj. Flowers's other task, the development of antiserums. This has been his major work in recent years, and he has been remarkably successful at it, developing new techniques at Fort Knox, and applying them during a public health advisory mission in Costa Rica, a country where snakebite is a major cause of death. The development of antiserums requires supplies of snake venom, and there is only one good way to get it—by "milking" the snake. "It's definitely no job for an amateur," said Maj. Flowers, who has been bitten twice in the past five years, spending a total of four months in the hospital. How did Maj. Flowers get interested in snakes? He started serious work on them in veterinary school at the University of Georgia, in a part of the country where it's common for bird dogs and farm animals to be bitten. "When I was a kid, I jumped just as high as anybody else when I saw a snake," he said. "But as I grew older, I studied snakes to learn why people were afraid of them, and from then on, I was set in my life's work." Besides, he added, "everybody is supposed to have his own bag these days. Mine just happens to be filled with snakes."

AMC receives safety award. For the fourth time in the last six years, the safety program of the Army Materiel Command (AMC) has been judged the best of any major command in the Army. Gen. Ferdinand J. Chesarek, AMC commanding general, received the Department of the Army Safety Award of Honor for fiscal 1968 from Gen. William C. Westmoreland, Army chief of staff, in a recent Pentagon ceremony. AMC previously received this award in 1963, 1966 and 1967. In 1965, the command was awarded the DA Safety Award of Merit.

Six get top DOD civilian awards. Two Army career civilian employees were among the 1968 recipients of the Department of Defense Distinguished Civilian Service Award. The awards, the highest DOD can bestow on civilian employees, were presented in a recent ceremony by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird. Gerald B. Russell, deputy assistant secretary of the Army for installations and logistics, received his award for planning



Drinking tank? No, that cylinder is an experimental silencer which may make it possible to test-fire the M60 tank's 105-mm. gun at the Army Weapons Command's range on Arsenal Island, Ill. The gun's test "projectiles" are cardboard cylinders filled with water and sand. If successful, the new silencer will make it unnecessary to ship recoil mechanisms to Aberdeen Proving Ground for testing after having been assembled at Rock Island.



AAI SPIW RIFLE

and setting up a new world-wide logistics management system. Mr. Russell was director of international logistics, office of the deputy chief of staff for logistics, at the time. Dr. Robert S. Wiseman was cited for "planning and directing the Army Night Vision Program," as director, Combat Surveillance, Night Vision and Target Acquisition Laboratories, U.S. Army Electronics Command. Dr. Wiseman is now the command's deputy for laboratories, at Fort Monmouth, N.J. The other recipients of the medal were: Dr. Arsham Amerikan, chief engineering advisor to commander, Naval Facilities Command; Dr. John P. Craven, chief scientist, U.S. Navy Deep Submergence Systems Project; Dr. Timothy W. Stanley, defense advisor of the U.S. mission to NATO; and Dr. Lorenz E. Zimmerman, chief of the ophthalmic pathology branch, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology.


Want to be a Golden Knight? Beginning the last week in October, the Golden Knights—the Army's crack parachute team—will try out 25 applicants for assignment to the team. To be eligible, applicants must be Regular Army enlisted men stationed in the United States or on the way home from overseas, have at least 18 months of service remaining, be airborne qualified and have made at least 100 free-fall jumps. If an applicant is accepted for tryout, CONARC headquarters will be asked to assign him to 45 days of temporary duty with the Golden Knights. If he passes the tryout, the soldier serves a 90-day trial period with the Golden Knights before final acceptance. For more information, write: Commanding Officer, U.S. Army Parachute Team, Box 126, Fort Bragg, N.C., 28307.

SPIW tests set for 1970. After a decade of research and design effort, the Army will commit prototypes of the dart-firing special purpose individual weapon (SPIW) to engneering tests and limited field experiments next year. The XM19 SPIW rifle is the most highly developed of three weapon systems being considered under the Army small arms program (ARSAP) to give the foot soldier more firepower and a higher percentage of hits. The prototypes will be made by AAI Corp., of Cockeysville, Md., who developed the rifle under contract from the Army Weapons Command. The first batch of 20 will undergo engineering design tests at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md., and Fort Benning, Ga. Field experiments will take place at Fort Ord, Calif., later in the year. The XM19 fires 5.6-mm. flechettes (darts) in single rounds, fully automatic or in controlled, three-round bursts. The action is operated by a miniature, primer-actuated piston built into each round, doing away with the conventional gas system and its heavy operating rods. The other two systems being developed under ARSAP are a micro-caliber, high-velocity bullet rifle and a multiple-dart launching tube.


GENERAL OFFICER CHANGES



Lt. Gen. Albert O. Connor from DCSPER to Third Army.



Lt. Gen. John A. Heintges from Seventh Army to Eighth Army.




Lt. Gen. Walter T. Kerwin from OCSA to DCSPER.



Lt. Gen. H. J. Lemley Jr. from DCSOPS to AFSOUTH.




Lt. Gen. H. A. Miley Jr. from DCSLOG to AMC.



Lt. Gen. J. L. Throckmorton from Third Army to STRICOM.




Maj. Gen. Dayton W. Eddy from JCS to OCSA.




Maj. Gen. P. A. Feyereisen from Ft Monmouth, N.J., to AMC.




Maj. Gen. J. M. Hightower from ORC to JUSMAG, Greece.



Maj. Gen. J. L. Klingenhagen from OCSA to ACSFOR.




Maj. Gen. Edward L. Rowny from EUCOM to OCRD.



Maj. Gen. Glenn D. Walker from CONARC to USARV.



Maj. Gen. S. H. Matheson from Ft Campbell, Ky., to Eighth Army.



Maj. Gen. A. P. Rollins Jr. from Ft Leonard Wood, Mo., to Engr Div, Vicksburg, Miss.

Brigadier Generals: **John W. Barnes** from USARV to OCRD. **A. R. Bolling Jr.** from USARV to ACSFOR. **George W. Casey** from Ft Leavenworth, Kan., to USARV. **Gordon B. Cauble** from STRATCOM to JCS. **William W. Cobb** from Ft Knox, Ky., to USAREUR. **Fred W. Collins** from ASAE to ASA. **James V. Galloway** from MACV to Ft Knox, Ky. **John J. Hennessey** from Ft Bragg, N.C., to USARV. **I. R. Obenchain Jr.** from DCA to STRATCOM. **T. R. Philbin Jr.** from EUCOM to Ft Meade, Md. **Harold W. Rice** from ACSC-E to Ft Monmouth, N.J. **Wm. W. Stone Jr.** from AMC to ACSFOR. **Robert D. Terry** from STRATCOM Pacific to DCA.

MANAGING NATIONAL SECURITY

THE PRESIDENT AND THE MANAGEMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY. *Keith C. Clark & Col. Laurence J. Legere. Frederick A. Praeger; 274 pages; $6.95*

You would think that by now our country, the greatest power in history, should have developed the machinery for planning its "national security." But, as this report states, *"only two decades have passed since our government found it necessary to create deliberate arrangements for 'policy planning,'* to assign talent and resources within the government to this function, and to sponsor a special category of institutions outside the government called 'think tanks.' " [Emphasis added.]

The product of a "think tank," this report reviews the record of these 20 years, stating that "In spite of the many adjustments and adaptations in national security arrangements during the last twenty years, there has been persistent dissatisfaction with and criticism of the management of affairs."

"There has also been considerable feeling on the part of students of government and government officials," the report adds, "that major changes in the international climate may call for new approaches and that organization and procedures devised to deal with old challenges may not be adaptable to the new."

The report was sponsored by the Institute for Defense Analyses and supplemented by a grant from the Ford Foundation. Its purpose was to furnish the new administration of President Nixon with "some informed reflections on decision-making in the . . . area of national-security policy." With two editors, an additional five editorial assistants, seven contributors, 18 consultants whose names inspire awe in anyone who reads in this field (Huntington, Kissinger, Schelling, to mention three), and based on interviews with more than 100 government officials, this small volume is better than one has reason to expect. (I avoid calling it a book because it is a published study and has many earmarks of what a critic could call a "non-book." One such characteristic is the inexcusable lack of an index.)

For a report of this nature, a product of "group think," it is remarkably candid in its criticisms and specific in its recommendations. Many references are made to the diminished authority of the armed services. It is suggested that "national-security practices and procedures . . . [should] be capable of handling more than one matter of high priority at a time." Mention is made of the secretary of defense's failure to give the JCS proper political and economic guidance, with the result that "the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan [JSOP] . . . has remained largely outside the arena where the real action takes place."

Another comment is that "more systematic procedures in policy making" are needed, and less of the "free swinging type . . . [that] prevailed throughout the Kennedy - Johnson years." Much is said about the need for the State Department to become more effective, to show some initiative and to learn to plan. "Planning is not part of the State Department's tradition," the report points out. "Mention of the word in some circles there produces a glazing of eyeballs or uncomprehending remarks, such as: 'Planning? Why, I plan every day of the year.' "

But the biggest problem in "the management of national security," one that needs solving with wisdom and leadership, not advice and management, may be the one mentioned in the very first sentence of this report and then ignored in succeeding pages: "It is a commentary on our society and era that almost all statesmen complain bitterly about how little time they can devote to reflection on even the most critical problems they confront—including those they can foresee long in advance."

COL. MARK M. BOATNER III

RECRUITING AND THE DRAFT

WHO WILL DO OUR FIGHTING FOR US? *George E. Reedy. World Publishing Company. 126 pages; $3.95*

The question posed—who will do our fighting for us?—is not quite the issue. The title, together with two alternatives placed on the book jacket, would have us believe that we face the clear-cut choice of having an army of citizen soldiers or one of professional mercenaries. This is not the point at all.

What is really the cause of widespread discussion these days is the controversy over how well Selective Service operates. In a time when a limited war in Vietnam requires less than the entire reservoir of manpower available to the nation, are those who are selected to serve in the armed forces being chosen fairly and equitably among the eligibles? Or are the poor and the black being discriminated against?

Let's face it at the outset. Life is never fair. Nor can any system dealing with impersonal figures and statistics in the large always be fair to every person. Mobilization, concerned with getting not only the right numbers but also the right kinds of men into the armed services at proper times, can never function perfectly, particularly since it is concerned as well with preserving the economic, industrial and educational health of the nation. Conscription, the draft, is a vital part of the recruitment process.

It is a tough job, and complex. But what every American expects—and has the right to expect—is that the system will work as impartially as possible, that favoritism will be absent, that built-in inequities will be reduced to an absolute minimum.

The most persistent criticism is that Selective Service favors the well-to-do, the moderately well-off segments of the population, those young men who go to college and get deferments for that reason. Yet, the most vociferous cries against Selective Service come precisely from the college campus, mainly because this is where an important source of American opposition against the war in Vietnam is located.

Those who oppose the war and, consequently, the draft, offer two polarized alternatives: pacifism or military forces composed wholly of professionals. Let's dispose of these before we get to the heart of the matter.

Pacifism, I believe, is perfectly valid as personal philosophy, but it hardly warrants general social acceptance in these perilous times. A wholly professional army—having little contact with the mass of Americans, lacking roots in the people, and threatening to become alienated from the mainstream of American life (which I believe is not militaristic)—is less than satisfactory for Americans (despite the President's purported inclinations in this direction). Within the context of the present-day debate over Selective Service, pacifism and professionalism are extremist attitudes and offer imprac-

tical solutions to the problems of mobilization and foreign policy.

Mr. Reedy, former adviser to President Johnson and member of the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service, makes a useful contribution to the debate on our present method of recruitment for limited or partial war. His book is an essay in the form of a conversation. Neither history nor polemic, it is rather an informal chat exposing the author's lucid and balanced point of view on a variety of subjects related to mobilization and conscription:

- The context of the current debate on selective service;
- The uncertainty that draft-age youngsters face (because they cannot tell whether they will be drafted or not, it is difficult for them to plan their life's work);
- The meaning of a wholly volunteer army (20 years ago, opponents of a racially integrated army were saying the same thing, that volunteer fighting forces would be manned ultimately entirely by blacks—which is the wrong reason for opposing the proposal);
- Alternatives to the draft (should, for example, service in the Peace Corps be the equivalent of military service? Most people agree that it should not);
- The principle of random selection (the lottery approach, which Mr. Reedy favors as being the most equitable);
- Some information on how local draft boards work;
- A short discussion of the morality of conscription (personal ethic versus social need).

All are important topics, and Mr. Reedy's discussion is always appropriate and easy to take.

As Senator Edward M. Kennedy says in his introduction—with grace, clarity and force—the whole point is not how to do away with the draft but how to reform the Selective Service, which, he charges, operates "unevenly, unfairly, and unpredictably," in the process "abridging personal freedoms unnecessarily." The senator and Mr. Reedy both document this assertion.

Mr. Reedy might have augmented the value of his book by giving us a broader view of conscription, how it has worked in the past, how it works in other countries, and what forms it takes. He should, I think, have made much more use of the materials gathered by the National Advisory Commission, for that survey of Selective Service deserves the widest possible reading by concerned Americans.

As the Selective Service Commission headed by Burke Marshall asked, "Who is to serve when all do not serve?"—when we have too many to use. How can we best determine who shall sacrifice time and bear the risk of death in uniform—and who shall not?

Mr. Reedy has two concrete points. He says we should draft the youngest first, those who are 19 years of age, for they make the best, most adaptable soldiers and for the most part they have yet to make firm career decisions; and we should drastically curtail deferments and choose those who are to serve in the military by means of random selection, a lottery, which discriminates against no one.

His recommendations make sense. In addition, he sheds light on the relationship between mobilization and foreign policy, on the need to remove legal restraints to equal treatment for all Americans, and on national institutions that historically have followed discriminatory patterns. Mr. Reedy has spoken well.

LT. COL. MARTIN BLUMENSON

VARIED FARE

Ambush. *Brig. Gen. S. L. A. Marshall. Cowles Book Co. 242 pages; illustrated; maps; index; $5.95*

Gen. Marshall's latest work concerns actions fought by battalions of the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions during Operation Attleboro, principally at Dau Tieng (Dong Minh Chau). The second half takes the reader with these troops (and Special Forces advisors and Montagnards) on jungle patrols. The title is apt, for the story stresses ambushes into which U.S. troops were lured. As usual, material for his story came to Gen. Marshall from soldiers who did the fighting.

Black Heroes in Our Nation's History. *Phillip T. Drotning. Cowles Book Co. 242 pages; illustrated; index; $5.95*

This book was a long time in arriving. Almost all others about black servicemen deal with the Civil War and later conflicts; this is the first that tells how they fought alongside white comrades from Bunker Hill to Vietnam. Theirs is a splendid record that historians up to our times have overlooked, if not avoided. Mr. Drotning has done a topnotch research job, coming up with black people other than soldiers who have helped shape our country's history, from those who accompanied explorers Francisco Coronado and John Smith to those who helped settle and extend the frontier and develop the West (how could the author have overlooked Matthew Henson in Arctic exploration?). Brig. Gen. Frederic E. Davison wrote the foreword.

The War in the Far East: 1941-1945. *Basil Collier. William Morrow & Co.*

Because of Mr. Collier's work on *The Defence of the United Kingdom,* in the British official history series, and on one of the best one-volume accounts of World War II, we expected this book to be better than it is. While it offers skillful, broad treatment, it is lacking in certain respects. Political and military plans of both sides and naval actions are well related, but readers may complain about superficial treatment given at times to land operations by U.S. forces. Not that the U.S. effort is slighted. The trouble is that the book is written through British eyes which look more closely at Commonwealth operations in Burma, Malaya, Hong Kong, Borneo, Singapore and other places, at the expense of the same sort of treatment, say, for the fall and recovery of the Philippines and the ground road to Japan (for example, Iwo Jima gets about two pages, Okinawa one paragraph).

The War of 1812: A Compact History. *Maj. James Ripley Jacobs & Glenn Tucker. Hawthorn Books. 224 pages; maps; index; $6.95*

Maj. Jacobs, authority on the U.S. Army's beginnings, relates the conduct—and misconduct—of the campaigns on land; the naval war is taken care of by Mr. Tucker. Together they have turned out a highly readable, concise account of a war that could have been averted and which was strongly opposed by people on both sides. In discussing the campaigns, the authors carefully explain the difficulties that beset Britain in fighting what her preoccupation with Napoleon made a "global" war—something not always present in other accounts of the War of 1812.

Weapon Systems Decisions. *David B. Bobrow, ed. Frederick A. Praeger. 285 pages; $17.50*

Studies by a group of social scientists, mainly in the political and psychological variables in national security decisions, continental defense policy and its ABM and civil defense shelter components. Most applicable today are the chapters "Chinese Communist Response to Alternative U.S. Continental Defense Postures," "The Genuineness of Soviet Elite Fear of U.S. Aggression," "Estimation of Soviet Response to Alternative U.S. Defense Postures," and "Prediction of U.S. Public Response to a Damage-Limiting Program."

Gain in Members Again Breaks Records

As of 30 June, AUSA membership had climbed to another all-time high, reaching 111,540, as Operation Great Leap Forward—AUSA Style passed the halfway mark in the 1969 campaign.

This is the second successive month in which Great Leap Forward has pushed membership to new heights. On 31 May, when the previous all-time high was reached, membership was 107,918. The first record-breaking total of the campaign was 106,723, reported 31 March.

Subscriptions for ARMY Magazine have expanded correspondingly. Circulation on 30 June was 119,623, compared with 115,564 on 31 May. On 31 March it was 114,750.

When Operation Great Leap Forward—AUSA Style formally got under way 1 January 1969, AUSA had 97,200 members and ARMY had a circulation of 104,450. The 30 June report, therefore, shows gains of 14,340 in membership and 15,173 in magazine circulation for the first six months of the campaign.

Plans for Great Leap Forward called for an expansion in membership to at least 110,000 by 30 June. This goal has not only been reached but surpassed by a comfortable margin. The success of the campaign at the halfway mark is attributed to the zeal of the chapters in pursuing individual targets chosen by them when the campaign opened.

Another contributing factor has been recognition by the chapters that the strength and effectiveness of the Association's support of the U.S. Army requires the participation of citizens of the community, civilian employees of the Army, retired military, and members of reserve components as well as Army career people.

For the calendar year 1969, Great Leap Forward has set its objective as 115,000 members. If the campaign's current momentum is maintained, there appears to be no reason why this goal cannot be reached and greatly surpassed.

AUSA NEWS

Corporate Membership Is Forging Upward As 127 Firms Affiliate with 15 Chapters

Corporate membership continued to gain in June as 43 additional firms, affiliated with five chapters, enrolled in the program. New enrollments, plus the 84 firms which had joined since the program began on 1 January, raised to 127 the number of firms in the program as of 30 June. They are affiliated with 15 different chapters.


AUSA corporate membership is complementary to the Association's sustaining membership which for many years has proved its value to large corporations in their relationships with the Army. The purpose of corporate membership is to provide similar services for small businesses by acquainting them with the Army's requirements and opportunities through AUSA programs, projects and published materials.

As in previous progress reports, Daniel Boone Chapter again is in front, having enrolled 21 firms in June for a six-month total of 48. The list of new corporate members and the chapters with which they have affiliated since 11 June follow:

Daniel Boone Chapter

England Furniture Inc.
Winn Dixie Food Stores
First Federal Savings & Loan Assn.
Fort Knox Travel Agency
Knox Car Wash
Automatic Laundry
Woltz Studio
Swiss Capital Laundry
Knox Motors
Radcliff Concrete Inc.
Osborne Brothers Quarry
S. C. Barnes Insurance Agency
E. L. Anderson & Son
Bean Publishing Co.

(continued on page 70)



Hub of the South Chapter—Brig. Gen. Leonard S. Woody (right), new president of the AUSA Third Region, installs William T. Auld (center) as chapter president. Elected honorary president was Lt. Gen. Alvan C. Gillem (left), USA ret.

Gains Are Registered By Recruiting Action

Additional gains in recruiting new members and renewing expiring memberships were registered by AUSA chapters during the period 1 July 1968 to 30 June 1969. The top five chapters in each of the five strength groupings for the period were:

Over 2,000	
Columbus-Phenix City-Fort Benning	11,757
Braxton Bragg	11,160
Fort Riley-Central Kansas-Victory Division	6,606
Tennessee Valley	3,762
Central Texas-Fort Hood	3,683
1,000-1,999	
Bogardus S. Cairns	2,009
Central Savannah River Area	1,918
Tacoma-Fort Lewis-Olympia	1,547
8th Infantry Division	1,545
3d Infantry Division	1,478
500-999	
Dix	792
Fort Monmouth	734
Monterey Tri-County	717
Antilles	678
Fort Sheridan-Chicago	661
250-499	
Gallant Pelham	473
Southern Arizona	414
Southern Colorado	370
Fort Worth	335
Berlin	332
Under 250	
Isthmian	228
Southside Virginia	204
Douglas MacArthur	183
Wolters	183
Utah	182
Stuttgart	160

Corporate . . .

(continued from page 69)

Joe's Texaco Service
Fort Knox National Bank
Radio Station WSAC
Benningfield Furniture Co.
Kentucky Drink-O-Mat Corp.
Addie French Plumbing & Heating
Ramada Inn

Southern Colorado Chapter
American Stores Packing Co.
Star Journal Publishing Corp.
Ladd Lumber and Mercantile Co.
Sears, Roebuck & Co.
Railway Savings & Loan Assn.
First Federal Savings & Loan Assn.
Park National Bank
Arkansas Valley Bank
Pueblo Bank & Trust Co.
First National Bank of Pueblo
Sam Jones Agency
Sangre de Cristo Broadcasting Co.
Building Materials Center
Mennequa Bank of Pueblo
Pueblo Gas & Fuel Co.
B. & A. Bootery

San Diego Chapter
Copley Newspapers
Automotive Equipment Co.
Altair Manufacturing Co.

Hawaii Chapter
Holmes & Narver Inc.
Spud's Laundry & Dry Cleaning

Greater Los Angeles Chapter
H. C. Smith Construction Co.



Berchtesgaden—AUSA President Frank Pace Jr. (center) introduces Command Sgt. Maj. Robert Ham (left), 3d Infantry Division, to Mrs. Pace at European chapters meeting. At right is Lt. Gen. John A. Heintges, Deputy CINC USAREUR for Seventh Army. AUSA Trustees Council later approved creation of European AUSA Region.

Chapter Activities

East Bay Completes Flag Day Project

East Bay Chapter completed its most successful Flag Day project in June by enlisting the support of the four counties and 11 of the cities within its area in proclaiming 14 June as the official day dedicated to honoring the national colors.

The four counties were Alameda, Contra Costa, Napa and Solano. The cities which responded were Newark, Union City, Vallejo, Oakland, Hayward, Martinez, San Pablo, Richmond, Alameda, Fremont and Yountville.

The project was handled by the chapter's Flag Day committee, headed by N. T. Gage. Mr. Gage wrote letters to the boards of supervisors of the four counties, and to the governing bodies of the cities, enclosing texts of a suggested proclamation and a request that the chapter be notified of their actions.

Henry Leavenworth Chapter. Kansas City, Kan., began its observance of Flag Day on 13 June when the chapter presented to members of the board of education and library a flag recently flown over the nation's capitol. Chapter president Wash H. Brown said the purpose of the day-early presentation was to call attention to the official Flag Day (14 June) and to encourage display of the flag from homes and places of business. The flag was obtained through Rep. Larry Winn Jr., Kansas 3d District. Among those attending the ceremony were Kansas City Mayor Joseph H. McDowell; Wyandotte County Commission Chairman Cordell Meeks; Joseph J. Poizner, chamber of commerce president; E. J. McAnany, chairman of the chamber's military affairs committee; Richard Bond, administrative assistant to Rep. Winn; City Commissioners Peter J. Matson and Hugh P. Doherty; and County Commissioner Richard F. Walsh.

Braxton Bragg Chapter. A new table of organization was adopted at the chapter's annual meeting in June in an effort to give rank-and-file members more voice in chapter affairs. The new structure is based on four committees, each headed by a chapter vice president. The program committee, headed by James Paul, will deal with ROTC, community services, patriotic observances, Army nurses, West Point, industrial affairs, and speakers' bureau. Durant Cooper heads the administration committee, which covers the offices of treasurer and secretary, finance and budget, chapter meetings, national annual meeting, and awards. Under the membership committee come civilian members, military members, and Department of the Army civilian members. The public relations committee, headed by Robert Gray, covers press relations and radio-TV relations. Elected president was Joseph Barr, Fayetteville businessman. Lt. Gen. John J. Tolson, CG of XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg, was elected to the executive committee. In a brief address at the annual dinner, Gen.

Tolson warned the members against complacency which might develop as a result of the successful membership expansion registered during 1968-69.

Leonidas Polk Chapter. The first recipient of the chapter's annual scholarship was graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in June: Edwin A. Watson Jr., son of Lt. Col. and Mrs. Edwin A. Watson, of Chattanooga, Tenn. The plan, begun in 1964 for young men interested in a military career, provides a grant of $3,000 for one year at the Bullis School, Silver Spring, Md., in preparation for entering West Point. Students enrolled in high school junior or senior classes within the chapter's six-parish area adjacent to Fort Polk are eligible to compete. Other recipients of the annual award were: L. Michael Jones Jr., 1965; Gary F. Giesecke, 1966; Russell M. Craft, 1967; Michael F. Dennis, 1968; and Ivy I. Prudhomme, 1969.

Tennessee-Kentucky Chapter. Officers for the new chapter year were installed at the quarterly meeting at Fort Campbell: James Givens, of Hopkinsville, president; Richard Hardwick, of Clarksville, Tenn., first vice president; Robert Cave, of Hopkinsville, second vice president and treasurer; and Lt. Col. William L. Albright, of Fort Campbell, secretary. The chapter presented medallions to the three most recent Fort Campbell Soldiers of the Month: Sp.4 Edward Kizer, Sp.4 Richard Fleese, and Pfc. Michael Dahl. Sgt. John Woodruff also received a medallion for his work with the Fort Campbell junior MP program. Distinguished guests included Brig. Gen. John S. Lekson, commander of the Army training center; Mayor and Mrs. Alfred A. Naff, of Hopkinsville; and Mayor and Mrs. Charles Crow, of Clarksville.

Frankfurt Chapter. More than 80 members attended the chapter's quarterly meeting to hear an address by Col. Halvor O. Ekern, U.S. military and public affairs officer of the U.S. Embassy at Bonn, on "NATO, the Alliance after 20 years." Brig. Gen. Lawrence V. Greene, chapter president and chief of staff, V Corps, presided.

Hawaii Chapter. In celebration of the Army's 194th birthday, the chapter held a military ball on 13 June at Schofield Barracks. A feature was the installation of the new slate of officers with Allan Bush, Honolulu insurance executive, as president. Among those who joined in congratulating Mr. Bush were Gov. John Burns, of Hawaii, and Jim Dolim, outgoing president.

Antilles Chapter. Col. José E. Del Toro, USA, retired, was elected president at the general membership meeting and dinner at Fort Buchanan. Two new vice presidents were named: Jack Jacobs and Elmer Magaz—and incumbent vice presidents were reelected.

Bogardus S. Cairns Chapter. Lt. Gen. Charles W. G. Rich, deputy commander of CONARC, urged the members and guests at the general membership meeting to "blow the Army's horn." What we need today, he explained, is for the silent majority to speak out for the Army, and that in this connection AUSA can do much to educate the public and keep it informed of Army happenings. In discussing CONARC activities, Gen. Rich emphasized the value of the ROTC, the expansion of advanced training in preparation for Vietnam service, and the accomplishments of the officer candidate schools. Winners of the chapter's patriotic essay contest in the high school, junior high, and elementary school divisions were presented with plaques and U.S. flags which had flown over the capitol in Washington. Among the special guests were nine outstanding ROTC cadets from area high schools selected for their demonstration of leadership.

Hub of the South Chapter. Brig. Gen. Leonard S. Woody, newly elected president of the AUSA Third Region, administered the oath of office to the new chapter officers at a luncheon in June at Fort McPherson. They were Wm. T. Auld, president; Robert T. Baird Jr., and A. J. McDermott Jr., vice presidents; Col. Harry J. Maihafer, secretary; Glen A. Soderstrom, treasurer; and Bernard W. Abrams, historian. Lt. Gen. Alvan C. Gillem Jr., USA, retired, was elected honorary president.

Columbus-Phenix City-Fort Benning Chapter. Roy L. Smith Jr., Phenix City attorney, was named chapter president at the annual election meeting in June. Other new officers are Joe J. Flowers and Col. Jacob L. Riley, vice presidents; Col. Jack P. Pollock, secretary-treasurer; and Lt. Col. Douglas B. Tucker, assistant secretary-treasurer. Added to the board of directors were the mayors of Columbus and Phenix City. Guest speaker was Maj. Gen. George I. Forsythe, commander of the Army Infantry Center and Fort Benning. He stressed the value of civilian participation in AUSA and urged career soldiers to be more active in its affairs.

Tacoma-Fort Lewis-Olympia Chapter. A tribute to the late President Dwight D. Eisenhower and observance of the 25th anniversary of D-day in Normandy featured the chapter's summer meeting and dinner. Honor guests were the late President's brother, Edgar Eisenhower, of Tacoma, and Col. James Stack, who served as the general's aide. Guest speaker was Brig. Gen. Richard L. Irby, Fort Lewis commander, who praised the soldiers in Vietnam today as the best the Army ever had. The chapter elected these new officers: Harold A. Allen, president; Ray C. Moen and Ed Hudson, vice presidents; Bob Roberts, treasurer; and Col. Lester B. Johnson, secretary. The chapter drafted a resolution, for submission to the AUSA annual meeting, urging a campaign to offset attempts to belittle the armed forces and the ROTC.

Southern Colorado Chapter. Maj. Gen. Roland M. Gleszer, commander of the 5th Infantry Division and Fort Carson, was guest speaker at the June election meeting. His topic was his two commands and their relationship to national defense and to the community. Officers elected were Frank F. Boltezar, president; John I. Himelrick, vice president; Wayne B. Piper, secretary; and Ralph F. Warren, treasurer.

Berlin Chapter. Col. T. J. Cobb was elected chapter president at the general membership meeting. Other new officers are Lt. Col. H. F. Magill and Comd. Sgt. Maj. G. Otis, vice presidents; St. Sgt. Maj. C. B. Layfield, secretary; and Lt. R. Cleaver, treasurer. The chapter presented a certificate of commendation to St. Sgt. Maj. W. S. Eblin, Allied Staff, Berlin, for his performance as chapter secretary during the past year.

Baltimore Chapter. Brig. Gen. Paul W. Thompson, USA, retired, presented his first-hand recollections of the training, planning and execution of D-day in Normandy as guest speaker at the general election meeting. Before D-day, Gen.

★ STAR CHAPTERS ★

Chapters that reach or exceed their membership targets are classified as Star Chapters. The following list is based on the 30 June 1969 inventory made at AUSA national headquarters and the 30 June 1969 Great Leap Forward targets. Figures indicate the number of months chapters have been on target since 1 January 1966.

25 ★ Columbus-Phenix City-Fort Benning
24 ★ Central Texas-Fort Hood
22 ★ Southwest Michigan
18 ★ Fort Riley-Central Kansas-Victory Division
16 ★ Daniel Boone
15 ★ Braxton Bragg
10 ★ Heidelberg
10 ★ Hudson Valley
9 ★ Japan
9 ★ Newton D. Baker
8 ★ Greater Phoenix
7 ★ Frankfurt
7 ★ Topeka
6 ★ Alamo
6 ★ Vicenza-Verona
5 ★ San Bernardino-High Desert
5 ★ Tacoma-Fort Lewis-Olympia
4 ★ Gallant Pelham
3 ★ Tennessee Valley
2 ★ Hager
2 ★ Monterey Tri-County
1 ★ Gen. Wm. C. Westmoreland
1 ★ San Diego

ASSOCIATION OF THE U.S. ARMY

AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

THE ASSOCIATION OF THE U.S. ARMY shall be an organization wherein all who are in accord with its objectives may join in the exchanging of ideas and information on military matters, and in fostering, supporting, and advocating the legitimate and proper role of the Army of the United States and all of its branches and components in providing for and assuring the nation's military security.

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Sid Wieser
Lampasas, Tex.

Thompson commanded the Assault Training Center, at Mortehoe, England, where the 29th Infantry Division and other U.S. divisions trained. Later, he was on Gen. Eisenhower's staff. Among the 250 interested listeners were Gen. Albert Wedemeyer, USA, retired, and Lt. Gen. Jonathan Seaman, commander of First Army. Officers elected include Thomas W. Trice, president; Maj. Gen. William J. Witte, Vernon R. Rawlings, Col. Phillip H. Pope and Col. Edwin J. Wolf, vice presidents; and Lt. Col. Jack D. Kaufman, secretary-treasurer.

San Francisco Chapter. Army secretary Stanley R. Resor gave the chapter an analysis of the Safeguard ABM system at the annual election dinner at the Presidio. More than 200 members attended and unanimously elected Col. Richard C. Ham, USAR, retired, president; Lt. Gen. James L. Richardson, USA, retired, Walter J. Currie, George V. Leftwich, Edward W. Scott and Richard P. Nave, vice presidents; Henry R. Morris, treasurer; and Albert W. Winter, secretary. The retiring officers were given awards of appreciation: Benjamin H. Swig, president; L. Jack Block, vice president; Woodrow W. Denney, treasurer; and Maj. Gen. John E. Theimer, USA, retired, membership chairman.

Tennessee Valley Chapter. Membership has reached its highest in the chapter's ten-year history, and a large portion of the gain is attributed to a recent upsurge in the number of women members. The chapter now has 4,482 members, and community and industry members are expected to boost the total by several hundred. Some 750 members are women, and the chapter believes its distaff membership is the largest of any AUSA chapter. The influx of women is attributed to the nomination of a woman employee of the Missile Command to the chapter's board of directors. In her support, more than one thousand women attended a luncheon at which their commander, Maj. Gen. Charles W. Eifler, explained the purpose and objectives of AUSA.

Connecticut Chapter. Charles W. McGuire, Apollo safety director, Office of Manned Space Flight, explained the NASA Apollo safety system as guest speaker at the annual dinner meeting in Hartford. Mr. McGuire illustrated his talk with slides of various space vehicles and their components, and answered questions from members, guests and newsmen.

Fort Monmouth Chapter. Officers for the coming year were installed at a dinner meeting at Fort Hancock. J. Francis Rauch, George Zuckerman, and Kenneth J. MacDonald Jr. were continued in office as president, first vice president, and secretary, respectively. New officers are Edwin M. Ambler and Maj. Gen. James Dreyfus, vice presidents, and Charles M. Arthur, treasurer. The installation dinner followed a tour of air defense installations at Fort Hancock and Highlands. Host and principal speaker was Brig. Gen. Robert H. Safford, commander of the 52d Artillery Brigade.

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